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INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE CASE
OF JOHN WILLIS AND CANADIAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW©
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The intellectual legal history-the history of
ideas--of modern administrative law has yet to be
written. The first part of this article suggests that one way
to approach this necessary task is to posit the writings of
leading administrative law thinkers in the context of
cases, controversies, doctrines, events, and movements
throughout the twentieth century. The work of pioneer
administrative lawyer John Willis is used to exemplify
this type of contextual ized intellectual legal history. The
second part of this article seeks to gauge Willis's
influence on the development of Canadian
administrative law.
L'histoirejuridique intellectuelle (l'histoire des id6es)
du droit administratif modeme n'a pas encore &6 6crite. La
premiere partie de cet article propose qu'une des faons
d'aborder cette indispensable tfiche serait d'avancer les
6crits des principaux penseurs du droit administratif dans le
contexte des cas, des controverses, des doctrines, des
6v6nements et des mouvements dans tout le XX' si cle. Le
travail de pionnier de John Willis, avocat spcialis& en droit
administratif, est utilis6 pour illustrer ce type d'histoire
juridique intellectuelle contextualis~e. La deuxi~me patie
de cet article cherche I 6valuer l'influence de M. Willis sur
le daveloppement du droit administratifcanadien.
© 2005, M. Taggart.
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This article is in two parts. First, I will discuss how one might
undertake an intellectual history of twentieth-century administrative law.
Second, I will apply the method developed in the first part to the life and
work of a famous Canadian administrative lawyer, John Willis, and attempt
to trace his influence, not least on this law school. I hope to demonstrate
why intellectual history is interesting as well as enlightening.
I. METHODOLOGY
I will begin by sketching how I would go about "doing" an
intellectual history of twentieth-century administrative law. There are many
ways of doing intellectual history; few have been attempted in the context
of Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law.1 This is my way of
approaching the task.
What do I mean by intellectual history? It sounds rather grand,
even pompous. At the outset I beg your leave to beg some fundamental
questions, such as: what is an intellectual? Can lawyers be intellectuals? Is
law an intellectual study? Must one be an intellectual to "do" intellectual
history? Important as these issues are, they will unduly divert this article.
Not too long ago, intellectual history was called the history of
ideas.' In a nutshell, intellectual history attempts to understand ideas,
thoughts, arguments, beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, and preoccupations
I leave almost entirely to one side U.S. administrative law and its intellectual history. There are
significant cultural, social, political, economic, and legal differences between the U.S. and the Anglo-
Commonwealth world (comprising for my present purpose the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand). Moreover, the traditions and conventions of legal scholarship diverged sharply between the
U.S. and the rest of the common law world by mid-twentieth century. My inability to read French means
that much of Quebec administrative law scholarship is inaccessible and so I will confine my treatment
to the Engish-speaking provinces of Canada.
2 Donald R. Kelley, The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2002) at 2 [Kelley, The Descent of Ideas].
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that comprise the intellectual or reflective life of societies in the past.3
These ideas are shaped, of course, by culture, context, concepts, and by the
permeating influence of the past and swirling current events.4 In studying
what is sometimes called the "life of the mind," one has to endeavour to
gauge the influence of many factors on the thinker and her thought, before
one can examine her influence on other people and events.
The intellectual history of twentieth-century Anglo-Commonwealth
administrative law sketched here adapts and applies the tools of intellectual
history developed in other disciples, particularly philosophy and history, to
the practical, grounded, and authoritative world of law. This can be done
by selecting influential figures who thought and wrote about administrative
law in the twentieth century, tracing the spread of their works and ideas,
and gauging the influence of that work.5
I have chosen to focus on the twentieth century for several reasons.
It is now possible to get some perspective on the century, or at least much
of it.6 The century began with Albert Venn Dicey's claim that the common
law knew nothing of administrative law, and ended with influential judges
and commentators saying that the recognition and rapid development of
administrative law was one of the greatest legal developments of the
century. The twentieth century also saw the emergence of a
professionalized legal academy and the gradual emergence of a voluminous
literature on administrative law. There are links between the historiography
of law and legal education in the twentieth century, and that of political
science and history.7 At the start of the twentieth century, legal and
constitutional history ranked in England and Canada as the most
prestigious form of historical inquiry,8 and the same was true in respect of
3Stefan Collini, "What is Intellectual History?" History Today 35:10 (October 1985) 46.
4 See Robert W. Gordon, Book Review of Tort Law In America by G.E. White (1981) 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 903 at 908-09.
5Felix Gilbert, "Intellectual History: Its Aims and Methods" (1971) 100 Daedalus 80 at 81-82.
6 Witness the outpouring of fin de sicle literature. See e.g. Vernon Bogdanor, ed., The British
Constitution in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: The British Academy, published by Oxford University
Press, 2003); Jack Hayward, Brian Barry & Archie Brown, eds., The British Study of Politics in the
Twentieth Century (Oxford: The British Academy, published by Oxford University Press, 1999).
7 Julia Stapleton, Englishness and the Study of Politics: The Social and Political Thought of Ernest
Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) [Stapleton, Englishness]; David Easton, John
G. Gunnell & Luigi Graziano, eds., The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey
(London: Routledge, 1991).
8 Richard A. Cosgrove, "The Culture of Academic Legal History: Lawyers' Law and Historians'
Law 1870-1930" (2002) 33 Cambrian L. Rev. 23; John E. Trent & Michael Stein, "The Interaction of
the State and Political Science in Canada: A Preliminary Mapping" in Easton, Gunnell & Graziano,
ibid. at 59, 61-62, 64. Indeed, it appears to have hung on longer in Canada.
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the nascent discipline of political studies (in Britain, deliberately not styled
"political science"). 9 This changed rapidly thereafter and it is only in the
last third of the century that law is once again looking over its disciplinary
parapet.
Of course, the twentieth century is not self-contained. The ideas
that shaped society and the law in that century obviously can and should be
traced back much earlier,'0 and many of these earlier ideas were challenged
by developments and thinkers in the twentieth century and, as a
consequence, were modified or rejected altogether. So it is neither possible
nor desirable to ignore them. It is enough to mention by way of example the
ubiquitous A.V. Dicey, who died in 1922 but, like the Phantom, is the ghost
who still walks in the grove of administrative law. Fortunately, there is good
work already done on Dicey and his ideas and influence," and it should not
be necessary to reinvent that wheel.
The type of intellectual history I propose can be pursued in a
number of ways. One can focus on one or more of the following: the ideas,
the thinkers, the cases and controversies, events or movements, particular
doctrinal developments, and/or the broader contexts within which change
is taking place. As the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm quipped, one
needs both a telescope and a microscope, 12 and, I would add, a camera with
a wide-angle lens.
To make this task manageable as well as grounded, one can weave
this legal doxography into studies of particular controversies-most often
See Stapleton, Englishness, supra note 7 at c. 2; D. Kavanagh, "British Political Science in the
Inter-War Years: The Emergence of the Founding Fathers" (2003) 5 Brit. J. of Politics and Int'l Rel.
594; and Jack Hayward, "British Approaches to Politics: The Dawn of a Self-Deprecating Discipline"
in Hayward, Barry & Brown, supra note 6 at 1.
10 One could go back, to follow J.G.A. Pocock's example, to Machiavelli's ideas and influence. See
A.B. McKillop, "Culture, Intellect, and Context" (1989) 24:3 J. Can. Stud. 7 at 15-16.
See H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [Arthurs, "A Slightly Dicey Business"]; Richard A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law:
Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist (London: Macmillan, 1980); Trowbridge H. Ford,Albert Venn Dicey:
The Man and His Times (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1985); Patrick McAuslan & John F. McEldowney,
eds., Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution: Essays Marking the Centenary of Dicey's Law of the
Constitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985); P.P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United
Kingdom and the United States of America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at c. 2; Martin Loughlin,
Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at c. 7 [Loughlin, Public Law]; David
Sugarman, "The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and Legal Science" (1983) 46 Mod.
L. Rev. 102; B.J. Hibbitts, "The Politics of Principle: Albert Venn Dicey and the Rule of Law" (1994)
23 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 1; Julia Stapleton, "Dicey and his Legacy" (1995) 16 History of Political Thought
234; Carol Harlow, "Disposing of Dicey: From Legal Autonomy to Constitutional Discourse?" (2000)
48 Political Studies 356; Lord Bingham, "Dicey Revisited" [2002] P.L. 39; and Rivka Weill, "Dicey Was
Not Diceyan" (2003) 62 Cambridge L.J. 474.
12 Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life (London: Allen Lane, 2002) at 294.
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"leading" cases, inquiries, events, or doctrinal developments-that were
sometimes influenced by the work of those thinkers and which, in turn, they
frequently reacted to. The point of alternating focus between the lives and
opinions of thinkers, and contextualized studies of particular
cases/controversies/events/doctrines is to give a realistic (and usable)
picture of the continuities and discontinuities of ideas in twentieth century
administrative law. Which ideas and texts gained traction, which did not,
and why? In this way the intellectual history of administrative law will
reside not only in the abstract realm of ideas, philosophies, and ideologies,
but will be grounded in texts, contextualized and posited within legal
thought and the broader culture. 3
There are two risks in contextual study. The first risk is that the
ever-widening circles of context are seemingly infinite, and that no person,
however intelligent and well read, can come to grips with all the material
in a lifetime, let alone in the life of a publisher's contract. The second risk
of contextualizing legal disputes and doctrine is that one can lose sight of
the law entirely. Some would say this is no bad thing, but a
lawyer-certainly this lawyer-is most likely to add the most value by
speaking about law and legal thought. 14 As in all scholarly work, lines must
be drawn in order to produce a manageable piece of work. This can be
illustrated by the life and work of John Willis, to which I will turn shortly.
If one looks at a number of thinkers and cases/controversies/
events/themes in context, decisions must be made constantly as to which
paths will most likely prove fruitful. Some context is necessary, as Quentin
Skinner said, for we need to know "who is wielding the concept in question,
and with what argumentative purposes in mind.' 15 In carrying on these
"dialogues with the dead,"' 6 we are attempting to find what questions they
were responding to in their day and perhaps, to shed light on questions we
face today-questions that pertain to current concerns that might have
13 Robert Post, "Introduction: The Relatively Autonomous Discourse of Law" in Robert Post, ed.,
Law and the Order of Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) vii.
14 See also Graham Parker, "Legal Scholarship and Legal Education" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J.
653 at 661.
15"What is Intellectual History?" History Today 35:10 (October 1985) 50 at 51.
16 The phrase is quoted and used by Kelley, The Descent ofIdeas, supra note 2 at 313 (he is talking
about the long dead). Many of the influential twentieth-century thinkers died sometime in that century
or this, but happily quite a few are alive and capable of modifying and developing their views (and
responding to contemporary intellectual historians).
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meant little or nothing to the authors of those texts. 7 As Rodney Barker
observed, the arguments of the 1940s centred on "[s]ocialism, capitalism,
class, cold war, equality, rationalism, modernisation, society," whereas in
the 1990s they were "replaced or eclipsed by nationalism, religion,
pluralism, autonomy, citizenship, post-modernism, and gender.',
18
Law is a fruitful discipline for discerning the influence of ideas
because it is text-based, authoritative, and highly precedent-dependent.
Administrative law is particularly well-suited to this type of study because
the subject has gone from supposed nonexistence to professional
acceptance and respectability in the course of the twentieth century, and its
development has gone hand-in-hand with the emergence of a substantial
literature and with the professionalization of law teaching. One advantage
of studying administrative law thinkers is that some of them in the second
half of the twentieth century produced textbooks in successive editions,
allowing us to draw textual and contextual pictures, and to identify
significant events and changing concepts. (It also allows us to see what was
not considered significant enough to record, and to mark the absence of
certain concepts.) Moreover, it is slightly easier in law to gauge the
influence of texts on legal culture-onjudges, practitioners, legal discourse,
the policy-making process, and legislation-and in the professionalization
and specialization of legal education. So these texts reflect as well as
contribute to changing ideas and arguments.
Administrative law was one of the fastest growing bodies of Anglo-
Commonwealth law in the twentieth century.' 9 The conventional reasons
given for this growth are the occurrence of two world wars and the Great
Depression, the consequent increase in state control and regulation, and
the rise (and fall?) of the welfare state. When the twentieth century began,
the prevailing view denied that Anglo-Commonwealth law knew any such
subject as "administrative law."2 The first British book with these words in
the title appeared in 1928, and the first comprehensive textbook was
17 Thereby blurring the line between the "contextualists" and "textualist" camps in intellectual
history. See William W. Fisher III, "Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History
of the Methodologies of Intellectual History"(1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1065 at 1068-70; John Henry
Schlegel, "Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers? Does Richard Posner Ever Sleep? Writing
About Jurisprudence, High Culture and the History of Intellectuals" (1997) 45 Buff. L. Rev. 277
[Schlegel, "Writing About Jurisprudence"].
"Political Ideas since 1945, Or How Long Was the Twentieth Century?" (1996) 10
Contemporary Brit. History 2 at 6.
See e.g. Jeffrey Jowell, "Administrative Law" in Bogdanor, supra note 6 at 373 [Jowell,
"Administrative Law"].
2 0 AV. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885)
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published as late as 1959.21 In Canada it took longer still.22 Major doctrinal
developments occurred in the U.K. in the 1960s and 1970s, decades
commonly associated with "judicial activism" in administrative law. In
Canada, the significant doctrinal developments occurred in the late 1970s
and 1980s. The textbooks that first appeared in the late 1950s and early
1960s became "classics," and a large literature emerged from the 1970s
onwards.
On the surface, these textbooks were expository, purporting to
order and organize the existing legal material, but it became increasingly
clear that the works were actually prescriptive and normative without laying
bare the norms or values at play.23 There was a dearth of theory and a
corresponding insularity and resistance to looking outside law for guidance
or to the much more theoretically sophisticated and interdisciplinary legal
literature in the United States. A clarion call went out for more
theoretically explicit administrative law scholarship. 24 This call was
answered, and in the last twenty years-especially since the early 1990s-
administrative law literature has taken a marked theoretical turn.
Within this excellent body of work, a few theorists have focused on
the ideology of administrative law scholars and the socio-political and
intellectual influences on them72 The work emanating from the U.K. has
tended to be taxonomic. Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings employed the
metaphor of the traffic light, labeling administrative lawyers as "red light,"
"green light," or "amber light" theorists.2 6 Martin Loughlin produced a rival
trichotomy: distinguishing conservative normativists, liberal normativists,
21 William A. Robson,JusticeandAdministrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution (London:
Macmillan, 1928); S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens & Sons,
1959).
22 Robert F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971).
23 See D.J. Galligan, "Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers" (1982) 2 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
257; Tony Prosser, "Towards a Critical Public Law" (1982) 9 J.L. & Soc'y 1.
24 Patrick McAuslan, "Administrative Law and Administrative Theory: The Dismal Performance
of Administrative Lawyers" (1978) 9 Cambrian L. Rev. 40; Jeffrey Jowell, "Administrative Law and
Jurisprudence" (1977) Acta Jur. 55.
25 In Canada, the exemplar is R.C.B. (Dick) Risk. For his publications and tributes, see G. Blaine
Baker & Jim Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode
Society by University of Toronto Press, 1999) vol. 8.
26 Law andAdministration, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997) c. 1-4 [Harlow & Rawlings, Law
and Administration]. For critique, see M. Taggart, "Reinvented Government, Traffic Lights and the
Convergence of Public and Private Law. Review of Harlow and Rawlings: Law and Administration"
[1999] P.L. 124 [Taggart, "Reinvented Government"]; L. Hancher & M. Ruete, "Forever Amber"
(1985) 28 Mod. L. Rev. 236.
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and functionalists.27 One difficulty with lumping scholars into "categorical
conceptions of schools of thought 2 8 is that often those identified dispute
the grouping, sparking further and often personalized debate;2 9 in the
process, the focus can shift away from improving understanding of the
doctrine and practice in the workaday world of administrative law in the
courts and the bureaucracy.30 The widening gulf between theoretical
scholarship and its utility to judges and practitioners is often remarked
upon in the American literature,31 and may be sensed in some of the recent
Anglo-Commonwealth literature (which often draws heavily on American
theory 2).
There is no monograph or extended survey of twentieth-century
developments in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law that seeks to
explicate systematically the role and influence of ideas and administrative
law thinkers in the modern evolution of the subject. Few of the leading
theorists and influential judges have been studied in any great depth.33
Moreover, there have been comparatively few contextual studies of
27 Public Law, supra note 11; Martin Loughlin, "The Pathways of Public Law Scholarship" in
Geoffrey P. Wilson, ed., Frontiers of Legal Scholarship: Twenty-Five Years of Warwick Law School
(Chichester: John Wiley & Co., 1995) 163.
28 D. LaCapra, "Intellectual History and Its Ways" (1992) 97 Am. Hist. Rev. 425 at 426.
29 See e.g. P.P. Craig, Book Review of Public Law and Political Theory by Martin Loughlin (1993)
13 L.S. 275.
30 See P. Cane, "Theory and Values in Public Law" in P. Craig & R. Rawlings, eds., Law and
Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 3
at 9 (although he thinks this preoccupation detracts from the search for values).
31 A catalyst for much debate was the article by Judge Harry Edwards, "The Growing Disjunction
between Legal Education and the Legal Profession" (1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921.
32 For criticism of misplaced reliance on American theoretical perspectives, see M. Loughlin, "The
Importance of Elsewhere" (1993) 4 Pub. L. Rev. 44; C. Harlow, "A Special Relationship? American
Influences on Judicial Review in England" in I. Loveland, ed., A Special Relationship? American
Influences on Public Law in the UK (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 79.
33 See e.g. J.L. Jowell, "Administrative Law" in J.L. Jowell & J.P.W.B. McAuslan, eds., Lord
Denning: The Judge and the Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) 209 [Jowell & McAuslan, Lord
Denning](on Lord Denning); K. Roach, "The Administrative Law Scholarship of D.M. Gordon" (1989)
34 McGill L.J. 1 [Roach, "D.M. Gordon"]; M. Loughlin, "Sitting on a Fence at Carter Bar: In Praise
of J.D.B. Mitchell" (1991) 30 lurid. Rev. 13; R.C.B. Risk, "John Willis-A Tribute" (1985) 9 Dal. L.J.
521 at 525 [Risk, "Tribute"]; Harlow & Rawlings, Law and Administration, supra note 26 at c. 1-3 (on
J.A.G. Griffith and H.W.R. Wade); J.A.G. Griffith, "The Common Law and the Political Constitution"
(2001) 117 Law Q. Rev. 42 (on Sir Stephen Sedley); P. Leyland & T. Wood, "Public Law History and
Theory: Some Notes Towards a New Foundationalism: Part 2: Some Contemporary Developments and
a Sketch for the Future" in P. Leyland & T. Wood, eds., Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old
Constraints & New Horizons (London: Blackstone, 1997) 405 (surveying the work of Trevor Allan,
Norman Lewis, Paul Craig, Martin Loughlin, Jurgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault); and D.
Dyzenhaus, "The Left and the Question of Law" (2004) 17 Can. J.L. & Jur. 7 (on Martin Loughlin).
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important public law cases and controversies by lawyers,34 nor much interest
in, or integration of, what other disciplines have had to say about them.
Thus far this relatively new genre of legal scholarship has flourished more
in private law.35
Little in the Anglo-Commonwealth legal literature comes close to
the sophisticated, nuanced, and stimulating intellectual histories produced
in disciplines cognate to law. The role of administrative law scholars in
receiving, forming, and communicating ideas to various audiences for
particular purposes, and the discovery (as far as texts and surviving records
allow) of their influence on legal development and on society is at present
unwritten. This is a large gap in the history of twentieth-century legal
thought, and attempts to fill that gap should transcend the parochialism of
law and be of interest to cognate disciplines.36
The contextualised intellectual legal historical method outlined
here will allow closer examination of the "creation story" of modern
administrative law.37 The story that almost invariably is told about the
growth of administrative law in the twentieth century is as follows: it begins
with Diceyan denial; proceeds through modest restraint in the exercise of
official power, then a judicial retreat in the face of wars, depression, and
the creation of the modern welfare state; is followed in the second half of
the century by an awakening of judicial concern for administrative justice;
and evolves in the century's death throes into a concern for fundamental
rights or "common law constitutionalism. '' 38 Legal study and the practice
of law are particularly susceptible to the perpetuation of myths. Lawyers
34 The honourable exceptions include Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578; Liversidge v.Anderson,
[1942] A.C. 206.
35 See generally A.W.B. Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995); K. O'Donovan & G.R. Rubin, "Introduction" in K. O'Donovan & G.R. Rubin, eds., Human
Rights and Legal History: Essays in Honour of Brian Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
1 at 7 [O'Donovan & Rubin, "Introduction"].
36 Contra M. Tushnet, "Legal Scholarship: Its Cause and Cure" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1205 at 1205.
37 See Sir Stephen Sedley, "The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law without a Constitution"
(1994) 110 Law Q. Rev. 270; Jowell, "Administrative Law,"supra note 19; and Jowell & McAuslan,Lord
Denning, supra note 33. For contrasting snapshots at the half-century, see W.A. Robson,
"Administrative Law in England, 1919-1948" in Lord Campionetal., eds.,British Government since 1918
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956) 85; W.A. Robson, "Administrative Law" in M. Ginsberg, ed.,
Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959) 193.
For a contextual and empirical challenge to the assumption of judicial non-intervention after the
Second World War, see Susan Sterett, Creating Constitutionalism? The Politics of Legal Expertise and
Administrative Law in England and Wales (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997) (written by
a legally-trained American academic political scientist).
38 T. Poole, "Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism"
(2003) 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 435.
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want a past that suits their particular purpose at the time they look back.
Focusing on particular cases or controversies in context and attempting to
understand them from the inside out, as well as from the outside in, can be
"profoundly subversive" of the orthodox legal understanding of legal
doctrine and debunk myths.39 While contextualization tends to reveal a
complicated, messy reality, this does not necessarily displace the influence
of ideas;40 often they can be seen more realistically and clearly at work.
Such studies might also provide an antidote to a court-centred view
of administrative law that comes about because of that bias on the part of
most of the influential scholars and the focus on leading cases. This is
mitigated somewhat by the fact that the pathology of cases almost always
becomes a study of policy choice and execution. Still there remain
significant theories and ideas of bureaucratic and political behaviour
concerning policymaking, lawmaking, and the implementation and
enforcement of law and policy that have not been as influential as they
could and should be in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law thinking.4'
This often explains the tensions between critics and supporters of particular
42
events, cases, or initiatives.
In all contextual and comparative study one must be vigilant against
falling into the trap of "boosterism";4 3 that is, of accentuating or
overestimating the importance of a particular case, controversy, idea,
scholar, jurist, or jurisdiction. A judicious blend of common-law
comparativism and contextualized study may counteract the ever-present
danger of simplistic or superficial comparisons between jurisdictions and
their laws.
3 9 R.W. Gordon, "Simpson's Leading Cases" (1997) 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2044 at 2044. Compare A.C.
Hutchinson, "The Importance of Leading Cases: A Critical Analysis" in Eoin O'Dell, ed., Leading Cases
of the Twentieth Century (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 1.
40 Gordon, ibid. at 2049.
41 This appears most frequently in the American literature contrasting legal and bureaucratic
conceptions of rationality and responsibility. See generally J.L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing
Social Security Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); J.P. Burke, Bureaucratic
Responsibility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses
of Discretion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); S. Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with
Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
42 See J. Willis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968) 18
U.T.L.J. 351 [Willis, "The McRuer Report"]; P. Boyer, A Passion for Justice: The Legacy of James
Chalmers McRuer (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, University of Toronto
Press, 1994) at 314-15.
43 See M. Taggart, Private Property and Abuse of Rights in Victorian England: The Story of Edward
Pickles and the Bradford Water Supply (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 195.
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At the same time one can see a tremendous amount of cross-
fertilization of ideas and doctrines in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative
law. This is what makes the comparative study of the history of ideas in the
development of U.K., Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
administrative laws throughout the twentieth century so interesting. Some
common-law scholars and jurists were "global" before we had the word to
describe the phenomenon-John Willis was in that class.
Why is it important to map the growth of administrative law theory
and doctrine on to the changing ideas of the roles and functions of the state
throughout the twentieth century? Because administrative law is the space
where the state (and its emanations) and the subject/citizen/rights-bearing
individual come into contact-and sometimes clash-and the maintenance
of a relatively free and democratic society depends on the fair and orderly
resolution of those disputes. Understanding the ideas that have shaped
those encounters enables us to better shape our future. With the state
currently challenged by globalization from without and privatization from
within, it is crucial to understand how we got to where we are, and where
the ideas may be taking us. John Maynard Keynes pointed out many years
ago that practical people (he actually said "[m]admen in authority") are
usually the "slaves" of "some academic scribbler of a few years back."'
It might be conceded that intellectual legal history can be
illuminating, but why focus on the intellectual history of administrative law?
Is administrative law not simply part of the larger subject of constitutional
law or, as we tend to say these days, public law? Is it not artificial to
examine this comer of public law when some/many/most/all of the ideas
that animate it are the same or similar to those operating elsewhere in
public law? There is much to be said for this criticism. I agree that the
interrelationship between administrative and constitutional law is
important, but this argument misses the point about why people first
wanted to recognize administrative law as legitimate-legitimate as a legal
topic, an organizing set of principles, a teaching subject, and a discrete sub-
discipline of constitutional law. Why did they fight over its recognition?
And when that battle was won, what did they turn their attention to next?
An important part of the history of administrative law is the way it became
recognized and then disentangled from constitutional law (in legal
education, legal literature, and the legal profession). The creation of
subjects, disciplines, or disciplinary boundaries is a feature of every area of
44
J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1936) at 383. On the immense influence of Keynes himself, see Richard Cockett, Thinking the
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983, rev. ed. (London:
HarperCollins, 1995).
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intellectual endeavour,45 and boundary maintenance and disintegration is
part of the process of knowledge production. Indeed, by the end of the
twentieth century, administrative law appears to be increasingly reabsorbed
by constitutional law, and its separate existence challenged by this
constitutionalization, as well as by privatization and regulation theory.46
So far I may have given the impression that the only administrative
law thinkers worthy of study are scholars-legal academics-but, of course,
in the common law system it is the judge rather than the scholar that has
had pride of place. The academic role has not been as glorious, central, or
appreciated as the judicial one. 47 As Carol Harlow put it, "[i]n the English
variant of the common law tradition ... scholars may not be judges and
judges have seldom been scholars., 48 This is not true in Canada, as shown
by the career of the scholar-turned-judge that Osgoode Hall's Bora Laskin
lecture series commemorates. 49 Still, the barricades between the academy
and the profession were real, and were constructed on both sides. They may
not be completely gone today, but they are hardly visible." So a balanced
45See generally T. Becher & P. Trowler,Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry and
the Culture of Disciplines, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001).
46 On the constitutionalization of administrative law, see generally D. Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity
of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); M. Taggart, "Reinventing Administrative Law" in N.
Bamforth & P. Leyland, eds., Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2004) 311; and D. Dyzenhaus, M. Hunt & M. Taggart, "The Principle of Legality in Administrative law:
Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation" (2001) 1 O.U.C.L.J. 5. On the suggestion that
privatization may "see off" administrative law, see Harlow & Rawlings, Law and Administration, supra
note 26 at 635. On the "threat" posed by the recent flowering of empirical and socio-legal studies to the
dominant court-centred conception of Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law, see P. Cane, "Review
of Executive Action" in P. Cane & M. Tushnet, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003) 146 at 149-53.
47 See Peter Birks, "Adjudication and Interpretation in the Common Law: A Century of Change"
in B.S. Markesinis, ed., The Clifford Chance Lectures: Volume 1-Bridging the Channel (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996) 135.
48,"Changing the Mindset: The Place of Theory in English Administrative Law" (1994) 14 Oxford
J. Legal Stud. 419 at 420. This is not, of course, the case in the United States. See J.T. Noonen, "Judges
as scholars. Are they? Should they be?" (2000) 84 Judicature 7. See generally R.C. van Caenegem,
Judges, Legislators and Professors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
49 Gordon Bale says that Vincent C. MacDonald was the first full-time academic lawyer to be
appointed to the Canadian bench, in 1950. See G. Bale, "W.R. Lederman and the Citation of Legal
Periodicals by the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993-94) 19 Queen's L.J. 36 at 58 [Bale, "W.R.
Lederman"]. MacDonald was an older colleague of John Willis's at Dalhousie and was the Dean of Law
(1934-1950) for almost all of Willis's first stint at Dalhousie. Willis was hired in 1933 by the then Dean,
Sidney Smith.
50 For attitudes towards the significance of academic work of more enlightened members of the
British bench and bar, see Lord Woolf, "The Atlantic Divide" (1999) 34 Tulsa L.J. 657 at 663-65; M.
Beloff, "The Academic Influences on Judicial Review" in R.J.F. Gordon, ed.,Judicial Review in the New
Millennium (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 91.
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approach to intellectual history would look at the thought and judgments
of the more reflective and influential judges.5t For the most part those
judgments have been the building blocks of scholars.
By any measure, enormous changes occurred in legal education in
the twentieth century, which saw the professionalization of law teaching,
the emergence of full-time legal training, the diminished role of
professional training, a vast expansion of research and publication outlets,
acceptance of law as a worthy university discipline, and the rise of global
law schools and legal scholars, to name but a few.52 One cannot understand
fully the contemporary influence of thinkers unless one recovers a realistic
context portraying the conditions in which they wrote and the conventions
that operated at the time. As we will see, when John Willis joined the oldest
law school in Canada in 1933 there were four full-time teachers, the "plant"
was atrocious, there was one recognizable law journal in Canada,53 judges
did not cite academics' work,54 the remuneration was barely adequate and,
the law school was run on a shoestring.5
What kind of influence can scholars have by their writing?56 They
can make other people think and, hopefully, influence their opinions. Who
are those people? The potential audiences (sometimes overlapping) include
other teacher-scholars (in law and/or cognate disciplines), students, lawyers
(generalist or specialist),judges, politicians, policymakers, decision-makers,
51 This is not to say that scholars and judges do or should perform the same role in their reflective
scholarship.
52 For the historical position in Canada see Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law
(Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983). In the U.K., see F.
Cownie, LegalAcademics: Culture and Identities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
53 In argument in a 1950 case, Chief Justice Rinfret is reported to have said that "he was not going
to accept the opinion of the Canadian Bar Review-a lawyer's magazine-as authority for the court":
Bale, "W.R. Lederman," supra note 49 at 50.
54 Ibid. at 49-61; G. Nicholls, "Legal Periodicals and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1950) 28
Can. Bar Rev. 422.
55 See generally J. Willis, A History of Dalhousie Law School (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979) [Willis, History].
56 This supposes that this is what writers want to do, and that may not be the case. As John
Schlegel once said in a challenging discussion about the doing of intellectual legal history: "Humans do
things, including the production and use of ideas, for their own purposes." See John Schlegel, "The Ten
Thousand Dollar Question" (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 435 at 456 [Schlegel, "Ten Thousand Dollar
Question"]. For instance, one might write simply for fun, in order to keep one's job, for purposes of self-
esteem or self-improvement, to fill in the day, or as therapy.
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and the lay public or sections of it.57 How can we know that the scholarship
has been read, and by whom?58 And how can you show that
scholarship-particular pieces or as a whole-caused a change of opinion?
What is the time period over which one hopes to influence one's target
audience? If that audience consists, for instance, of future leaders of the
legal profession and judges, then one might have to wait a generation or
two. 9 Very little work has been done on these issues, and what has been
done is problematic.6°
With this methodological outline in mind, I turn to the second part
of this article.
57
See B. McDowell, "The Audiences for Legal Scholarship" (1990) 40 J. Legal Educ. 261.
McDowell makes the point that many scholars are unsure of the audience(s) they are writing for. See
also E. Chemerinsky & C. Fisk, "In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance of Recognizing the Many
Audiences for Legal Scholarship" (1998-99) 34 Tulsa L.J. 667.
58 If the audience is, or includes, academics then the "traces" of a scholar's influence may be seen
"in the footnotes of the scholars who follow," but if it is directed to non-lawyers or the lay public, who
"have little use for footnotes," no trace may be left. See G.B. Packert, "The Relentless Realist: Fred
Rodell's Life and Writings" (1984) U. I11. L. Rev. 823 at 855. The practice, etiquette, and ethics of
footnoting and attribution vary considerably over time and place, and there is even considerable
individual variation at any given time and place. There is no research of which I am aware on these
aspects of legal scholarship.
M. Bouchard, "Administrative Law Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411 at 422.
60 F. McChesney, "Intellectual Attitudes and Regulatory Change: An Empirical Investigation of
Legal Scholarship in the Depression" (1988) 38 J. Leg. Educ. 211. McChesney attempted to test
empirically what influence the writings of legal academics had on the adoption or support of New Deal
regulatory reforms. He gathered interesting and valuable data that supported the view that legal
academics were no more supportive of government intervention in 1931-1935 than they were in 1921-
1925. (The casual empiricism of Blake Brown suggests that in Canada the pro-intervention legal
scholars made more headway in professional legal opinion by the late 1930s. See R.B. Brown, "The
Canadian Legal Realists and Administrative Law Scholarship, 1930-1941" (2000) 9 Dal. J. Leg. Stud.
36 at 70-72 [Brown, "Canadian Legal Realists"].) To my mind, however, McChesney does not prove that
legal academics' writings did not influence the adoption or implementation of the New Deal reforms.
To test that you would need to trace the sources of inspiration of those policies or reforms. Of course,
and this is perhaps beside McChesney's point, many of the pro-intervention legal scholars were
beckoned to Washington to practice what they had preached (often not in law reviews), and were too
busy to write at that time. There is considerable literature on this. See generally P. Irons, The New Deal
Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); J.A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics
in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Knopf, 1993); R.W. Gordon, "Professors and Policymakers: Yale
Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After" in A.T. Kronman, ed., History of the Yale Law School:
The Tercentennial Lectures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 75. These were men, as John
Willis said of his "hero" Thurman Arnold, that were "equally at home in the world of action and the
world of ideas." See J. Willis, Book Review of Voltaire and the Cowboy: The Letters of Thurman Arnold
ed. by Gene M. Gressley (1979) 5 Dal. L.J. 810 at 810 [Willis, "Book Review of Voltaire"].
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II. JOHN WILLIS
A. His Life and Times
Bora Laskin once said that he was "an unabashed admirer" of John
Willis. 6 They were close friends, and taught together for fifteen years, the
first five of which were at Osgoode Hall, before they departed with Cecil
("Caesar") Wright to establish the modern law school at the University of
Toronto in 1949. Laskin described Willis as a "legal titan," and so he was.
My purpose here is to say something about Willis's life and work and to
attempt to gauge his impact on law and scholarship.62
John Willis, the "grand old man, 63 of Canadian administrative law,
died on 16 June 1997, a week shy of his ninetieth birthday. Willis's
professional life coincided with the development of the "infant subject of
Administrative Law ' to maturity. His close intellectual and personal links
with legal scholars of similar persuasion at the London School of
Economics and at Harvard Law School meant that he brought to Canada
in the early 1930s the fermenting realist scepticism of judicial review, and
added to it a distinctive voice.65 It is difficult to overestimate his influence
on students and scholars of administrative law in Canada, particularly on
the scholars of the next generation or two at this law school.
Born in Buckinghamshire England in 1907, Willis was educated at
Winchester College and New College, Oxford. He graduated with a
"double first" in classics and jurisprudence.66 Little is known of his Oxford
61,"Foreword" (1983) 7 Dal. L.J. 3 (special issue in honour of John Willis) [Laskin, "Foreword"].
For an earlier tribute, see B. Laskin, "John Willis: An Appreciation" (1972) 22 U.T.L.J. 3 at iii. But see
B. Laskin, "Judges and Book Forewords" (1954) 32 Can. Bar Rev. 118.
62 Any writer about Willis and his work owes a large debt to Dick Risk, the only person to seriously
study Willis's work and influence during his lifetime. See R.C.B. Risk, "Tribute," supra note 33; R.C.B.
Risk, "Volume 1 of the Journal: A Tribute and a Belated Review" (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 193 at 201-03
[Risk, "Volume 1"]; R.C.B. Risk, "In Memoriam: John Willis" (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 301 [Risk,
"Memoriam"].
6 3 These words, used by Willis in his tribute to John D. Faclonbridge, seem to aptly describe Willis.
See J. Willis, "Introduction" (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 607 at 609.
Willis, History, supra note 55 at 88.
65 See Risk, "Tribute," supra note 33 at 548; R.W. Gordon, "Without the Law II" (1987) 24
Osgoode Hall L.J. 421 at 431 [Gordon, "Without the Law II"].
66 For bibliographical information I have relied heavily on the work of Dick Risk. See supra note
62. The death notice in the Halifax paper is also very informative: "Obituary" The Mail Star, (17 June
1997) A8. Thanks to Philip Girard for confirming this source.
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67years, except that he excelled among illustrious company. The Oxford
University Calendar for the year 1930 has "J. McK. Willis",68 in the first class
for classics in Hilary Term 1928, along with his contemporaries at New
College, R.H.S. Crossman (later Sir Richard Crossman) and R.O.
Wilberforce (later Lord Wilberforce), 69 and Q. McG. Hogg (later Lord
Hailsham) of Christ Church. The following year in Trinity Term, Willis
shared his first-class standing in jurisprudence with, among others, an
American Rhodes Scholar named M.S. McDougal, who went on to fame as
an international lawyer at Yale Law School.7 ° (Incidentally, in that year
another New College man, H.L.A. Hart, gained first class "In Literis
Humanioribus.")
After graduating with a B.A. from Oxford,7' Willis went to Harvard
Law School on a Commonwealth Fund (Harkness) Fellowship to study for
two years. Felix Frankfurter was his supervisor and became his mentor.72
The Oxford B.A. was not considered a law degree and so Willis was not
eligible to enroll in a postgraduate law degree at Harvard.73 The official
record has Willis listed as a "special student" from 1930-1932. In any event,
67 I am indebted to Peter Skegg of the University of Otago and formerly of New College who
kindly provided copies of the calendar entries. See Oxford University Calendar for theyear 1930 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1930) at 267, 271, 289, 442.
68 Willis's middle name was McKenzie, which was his mother's maiden name. Willis never used
his middle name or initial in any published work.
69 Richard Wilberforce and Willis were contemporaries at Winchester as well. It is a remarkable
coincidence that arguably the best British administrative law judge of the twentieth century and one of
the most elegant and pungent critics of judicial review should have been classmates throughout
secondary school and university. On Wilberforce, see D.G.T. Williams, "Lord Wilberforce and
Administrative Law" in M. Bos & I. Brownlie, eds., LiberAmicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce
PC, CMG, OBE, QC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 235.
70 The school of "policy science" that Myres McDougal founded with Harold Lasswell at Yale
after World War II, however, is generally thought "never [to have] had any significant influence on
American lawyers, judges, or legal scholars." See T.C. Grey, Book Review of Patterns of American
Juridprudence by Neil Duxbury (1996-97) 106 Yale L.J. 493 at 513.
71 A modest, not to say self-deprecating, man, Willis styled himself "John Willis, B.A." in official
University publications. See M. Orkin, "Lives Lived," The Globe and Mail [Toronto], 3 July 1997, A18.
He never applied to "upgrade" his bachelor's degree to an M.A., as Oxford graduates were entitled to
do.
72 Frankfurter is reported to have described Willis "as the most brilliant student he ever had." See
Peter Fraser, "John Willis" The Globe and Mail (24 July 1997) A14 [Fraser, "John Willis"]. Willis's
affection and respect for Frankfurter can be seen in his reviews of books by and about Frankfurter. See
J. Willis, Book Review of Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court by Felix Frankfurter (1961/1962)
14 U.T.L.J. 279 at 280 [Willis, "Review of Mr. Justice Holmes"] and Book Review of Felix Frankfurter:
A Tribute by Wallace Mendelson (1966) 16 U.T.L.J. 467.
73 Risk, "Tribute," supra note 33 at 526. Willis "shrank from the three-year grind that the
[Harvard] LLB would take" (letter from Willis to Dick Risk, dated 4 Ocober 1984).
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Frankfurter did not think it important for postgraduate students to work for
a degree. He wrote to one aspiring postgraduate student around this time:
"Personally I care little about degrees. I assume you are coming here to
begin an inquiry that will do you and the Law School credit. 74 And in
another letter to the same prospective student a few months later,
Frankfurter declared: "What is important is to do a piece of work."7 5 That
is exactly what Willis did, producing his classic monograph entitled The
Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments, published by
Harvard University Press under the imprint "Harvard Studies in
Administrative Law., 7 6 The book was critically acclaimed and was one of
the most reviewed law books of the year.7
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Nathan L. Jacobs (22 October 1929) in Felix Frankfurter's
Papers, Harvard Law School Library (Part III, Reel 19, frame 00609). Quoted with the permission of
the Harvard Law School Library.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Nathan L. Jacobs (20 January 1930), ibid.
76 The imprint was funded from some monies made available to Frankfurter and was the
publication outlet for the work of his most promising students. The other books in the series of six titles
are: E.W. Patterson, The Insurance Commissionerin the United States:A Study in Administrative Lawand
Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927); J. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of the Law in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927); H.M. Stephens,
Administrative Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: A Study in Jurisprudence and Administrative Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933); Carl McFarland, Judicial Control of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission 1920-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1933); and L.L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, in Particular of the Recognition of Foreign
Powers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). That Frankfurter did not have total control over
publication in the series is evident from the inclusion of H.M. Stephen's work. See D. R. Ernst, "Dicey's
Disciple on the D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative Law Reform, 1933-1940"
(2002) 90 Georgetown L.J. 787 at 794.
7 7 C.T. Carr, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments by
John Willis (1934) 16 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 96; J.A. Corry, Book Review of The Parliamentary
Powers of English Government Departments by John Willis (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 60 [Corry, "Book
Review of Parliamentary Powers"]; Armistead M. Dobie, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of
English Government Departments by John Willis (1933) 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 198; John A. Fairlie, Book
Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments by John Willis (1933) 27 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 994; J. Finkelman, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government
Departments by J. Willis (1935) 1 U.T.L.J. 196; Ralph F. Fuchs, "The March of the Bureaus" (1934) 20
St. Louis L. Rev. 189; H.J. Laski, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government
Departments by John Willis (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 [Laski, "Book Review of Parliamentary
Powers"]; John W. MacDonald, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government
Departments by John Willis (1934) 20 Cornell L.Q. 536; William A. Robson, Book Review of The
Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments by John Willis (1934) 34 Col. L.Rev. 189;
William A. Robson, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments by
John Willis (1934) 50 Law Q. Rev. 283; Paul L. Sayre, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of
English Government Departments by John Willis (1934) 19 Iowa L. Rev. 652; Roland S. Vaille, Book
Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments by John Willis (1934) 20
A.B.A.J. 776; E.C.S. Wade, Book Review of The Parliamentary Powers of English Government
Departments by John Willis (1933-34) 5 Cambridge L.J. 428.
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Following Frankfurter's advice, Willis audited classes given by the
great Harvard "names": Williston, Beale, and Scott.7 8 The influence of
these courses can be seen in the eclecticism of his early writings, and no
doubt stood him in good stead for the remarkably wide range of subjects he
would be asked to teach, first at the understaffed Dalhousie Law School
and later at law schools in Toronto.
Intent upon embarking on a career teaching political science in his
home country, even with the aid of the anglophilic Frankfurter,79 Willis was
unable to hold on to the promise of a position "in a first-rate department
of political science" in the depths of the Depression.8 ° Harold Laski, who
later wrote a favourable review of Willis's book, wrote to Frankfurter in
October 1932 that he had "got Willis a good offer of a six months' job in
Pekin [sic] and Nanking," expressing the hope that he would take it "as
there are very few academic posts about just now."'" Willis must have
declined this offer. However, an opening came up in 1933 at Dalhousie Law
School, whose teaching complement at around this time was described as
"three men and a boy." When one of the "men" departed for Harvard on
short notice, Willis was hired on a one-year contract.82 Unbeknownst to him
at that time, this was a life-changing move and from that point onwards he
was lost to England. When the Harvard "man" did not return, Willis got his
permanent post. He married a Canadian and made his home in Canada.
78 Willis, History, supra note 55 at 122.
79
On the close connections between Frankfurter and leading British intellectuals, especially
Harold Laski, see R.A. Cosgrove, Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American Legal Community,
1870-1930 (New York: New York University Press, 1987) c. 8-9.
80 Willis, History, supra note 55 at 122. It is likely the promise that could not be fulfilled was from
the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in the University of London. The evidence
for this is that Willis's link with the LSE was strong. Frankfurter had close links with Harold Laski, and
Willis featured at least once in their (unpublished) correspondence. Harold Laski reviewed glowingly
Willis's book in the Harvard Law Review. William Robson, also from LSE, praised the book in reviews
in Britain and the U.S.A. Laski tried hard to find a position for Willis, which could be because LSE had
let Willis down. Willis contributed an article on "Parliament and the Local Authorities" to a LSE-
inspired and edited collection: H.J. Laski, W.I. Jennings & W.A. Robson, eds.,A Century of Municipal
Progress: The Last Hundred Years (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935) c. 17. Lastly, LSE is likely to
have been the only place at that time in Britain that could be described as a "first rate department of
political science" [emphasis added].
81 Letter from Harold Laski to Felix Frankfurter (29 October 1932) in the Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Library of Congress, Container Number 74.
82 Unsurprisingly, Frankfurter recommended Willis. See Bora Laskin, Book Review of A History
ofDalhousie Law Schoolby John Willis (1982) 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 385 at 386. The relationship between
Dalhousie and Harvard Law Schools had been close since the early 1920s, when the first of a line of
Dalhousie law graduates went to Harvard to pursue postgraduate study. See Willis, History, supra note
55 at 88; E. Griswold, Book Review (1981) 31 J. Legal Educ. 677 at 679; and J.E. Bickenbach & C.I.
Kyer, "The Harvardization of Caesar A. Wright" (1983) 33 U.T.L.J. 162 at 164-65.
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Willis remained in the Canadian legal academy for most of the rest of his
professional life, and, with only a few exceptions, published in Canadian law
journals and university presses.
Willis taught at Dalhousie Law School from 1933-1944 and
returned there towards the end of his teaching career from 1972-1975,
before finally retiring. In between, he taught at Osgoode Hall Law School
in Toronto from 1944-1947 and 1948-1949,83 broken by a year working in
the legal department of the International Monetary Fund in Washington.
Willis, Bora Laskin, and Cecil (Caesar) Wright left Osgoode Hall in 1949
to establish the modern professional University of Toronto Law School.84
Willis left Toronto to return to Nova Scotia as a partner in a private law
firm in Halifax from 1952-1957. Enticed out of practice by George Curtis,
his former Dalhousie colleague and founding dean of the newly established
law school at the University of British Columbia, Willis taught at UBC from
1957-1959 but was unsettled.85 He returned to the University of Toronto in
1959 and stayed there until 1972 when he eased himself into retirement in
Nova Scotia.
Willis's legacy is a handful of classic articles on administrative law.
He was one of the originators, and certainly the best-known proponent,86
of a distinctive Canadian realist strand of scepticism towards judicial review
that has been hugely influential in Canadian administrative law and is its
most distinctive feature. As we will see, this approach is most closely
associated in Canada with Osgoode Hall Law School and in Britain with the
London School of Economics and Political Science. Willis had ties to both
institutions.87
83 See B.D. Bucknall, T.C.H. Baldwin & J.D. Lakin, "Pedants, Practitioners and Prophets: Legal
Education at Osgoode Hall to 1957" (1968) 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 137 at 213. The impression is given that
Willis joined the teaching staff in 1948, but this is incorrect.
84 See C.I. Kyer & J.E. Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: CecilA. Wright, The Benchers and Legal
Education in Ontario 1923-1957 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, University of Toronto Press, 1987);
Bucknall, Baldwin & Lakin, ibid. The other teacher to resign at this time was Stanley Edwards, who
went into practice. Wright's position had become untenable and he had resigned. The others resigned
in support of him and his ideals for professional legal education in Ontario. This act of loyalty was
especially courageous of Willis and Laskin, who as career legal academics resigned with no guarantee
of employment elsewhere as law teachers. Within two months all three had secured positions up the
road at the University of Toronto, but there was no assurance of that when they resigned from Osgoode
Hall in January 1949.
85 Interview of George F. Curtis, Professor and Dean Emeritus, University of British Columbia
Law School, Vancouver (19 December 1988).
86 This group included J.A. Corry, J. Finkelman, and W.P.M. Kennedy. See generally Brown,
"Canadian Legal Realists," supra note 60; Risk, "Volume 1," supra note 62; Richard Risk, "Canadian
Law Teachers in the 1930s: 'When the World was Turned Upside Down' (2004) 27 Dal. L.J. 1 at 30-48.
87 See supra note 80 and infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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B. The Human Side
Everyone who studies Willis senses the restlessness of unfulfilled
promise. His brilliant writings of the 1930s (when he was in his late twenties
and early thirties) were never bettered later in life,88 and seldom equaled.
His rate of production dropped off sharply. His most (in)famous later work,
his blistering attack on the McRuer report (1968), was "scribbled ... over
a weekend" because it raised all the bogies that Willis fought in the 1930s.89
His writing did not evolve; he did not grow further as a scholar.90 As noted
later, the exciting ideas littered throughout his casebook and some of his
writings (most often book reviews) about empirical study of law
enforcement, proposals to teach law in socio-legal context, et cetera, came
to little in the end.91
Of the small number of Willis's contemporaries at Oxford who went
into legal academic life, Myres McDougal and H.L.A. Hart made big names
for themselves at Yale and Oxford, respectively. Of his other
contemporaries in the first rank, Richard Crossman went on to moderate
fame in politics, and Richard Wilberforce and Quintin Hogg (a.k.a.
Hailsham) are assured of partial immortality through the high judicial
offices they held. Some of those who knew Willis speak of an underlying
discontent, a sense of under-fulfillment, and a lifelong self-effacement,
turning to reclusivity in his later years.92 Throughout his life he abhorred
tributes, and more than twenty years ago refused to sanction a Festschrift
if it contained any biographical material or tributes to his teaching. Willis
said he did not want to be memorialized like Frank Scott!93 But
88 Willis realized this himself. He said in 1977, when reflecting on his time at Dalhousie University
in the 1930s: "looking back on it, I thought more, worked harder, learned more, taught better and wrote
better ... than I have done since." See Willis, "In my day," infra note 133 at 62.
89 Risk, "Memoriam," supra note 62 at 303.
90 Risk puts this more softly but I do not sense disagreement. See Risk, "Tribute," supra note 33
at 541.
See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
92 See Fraser, "John Willis," supra note 72: "He was not a happy man. His career began like a
rocket: double honours at Oxford and, when he went to Harvard, described by Felix Frankfurter as the
most brilliant student he ever had. But Canada seemed a compromise for Mr. Willis. My belief is that
he really would have liked to go back to his native England."
In 1981 Professor Ian Hunter of the Faculty of Law in the University of Western Ontario
approached Willis, his former teacher, for his blessing regarding a book of essays in his honour. Willis
had no objection to work about his scholarship but vetoed any other tributes. As Hunter's interest was
primarily in those other aspects, the project did not go ahead. See Letter from Ian Hunter to M. Taggart
(3 August 1982). The reference to Frank Scott is recorded in a letter from Ian Hunter to M. Taggart
(14 September 1988). On Scott, see S. Djwa, The Politics of the Imagination: A Life of F. K Scott
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psychobiography is a problematic genre, and one in which I have no
training to undertake.94
I am acutely aware that I have not gone any distance here in
uncovering the real Willis-libraries and archives have not been scoured,
private papers of Willis (if any survive) and those of his peers have not been
combed, extensive interviews of family, friends, colleagues, and students
have not been conducted. 95 I need no convincing that intellectual history
should include as much as possible about the intellectual himself. But if I
had needed convincing, John Schlegel's impassioned denunciation of
intellectual history's attempts to suppress the "hero" and his plea to
celebrate the lives of the intellectuals themselves, warts and all, would have
convinced me of its importance. 96 Surely, as Schlegel indicated, it is
significant that Willis experienced public school and Oxford life, witnessed
the rise of English socialism, felt the brunt of the Depression, and missed
out on a job at Barclay's Bank in Chile because he did not have the right
accent. 97 Is it true that he left Dalhousie Law School for more money at
98Osgoode Hall, or was it to avoid the burdens of acting deanship, or a
combination of these things, or something different? Why did he take a
year off from teaching at Osgoode Hall to work in the legal department of
the International Monetary Fund? Why did he come back to teaching, and
how, if at all, did it inform his teaching (since it had no visible impact on his
writing)? Was it the same restlessness that took him back to Nova Scotia to
practice law for five years in the fifties? At what should have been his most
productive period as a scholar, why and what was Willis seeking-money,
financial security, challenge, real-world action? Contextualized, socialized
intellectual history should make these and a hundred other inquiries. Willis
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1987) and his Festschrift: S. Djwa & R. St J. MacDonald, eds., On F.R.
Scott: Essays on his Contributions to Law, Literature, and Politics (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1983).
94 Felix Frankfurter has received this attention. See H.N. Hirsh, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter
(New York: Basic Books, 1981) c. 1, 7. For the mixed reaction of reviewers, see W.A. Bogart, Book
Review of The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter by H.N. Hirsch (1983) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 405 at 411-15.
9 5 N.E.H. Hull has stressed the importance of intellectual, institutional and personal networks as
revealed by private sources. See N.E.H. Hull, "Networks & Bricolage: A Prolegomenon to a History
of Twentieth-Century American Academic Jurisprudence" (1991) 35 Am. J. Legal Hist. 307.
96 "Writing About Jurisprudence," supra note 17.
97 Recounted by H.W. Arthurs, "The Administrative State goes to Market (and Cries Wee, Wee,
Wee All the Way Home)" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 797 at 799.
98 This is what George Curtis told me: supra note 85.
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himself saw this as "gossip" and of no interest to others,9 9 but in this he was
wrong.
If the histories of the respective law schools are any indication, the
move from Oxford to Harvard in 1930 must have been a considerable
culture shock for the young Willis.l00 At that time, American legal academic
life was electrified by the current of legal realism.'0 ' In terms of
administrative law, Dicey's denial of the subject held academic and
professional sway in Great Britain. The infant subject was more developed
in the United States, largely through the pioneering work of Goodnow,
Freund, and Dickinson.10 2 The explosion of interest and literature lay ahead
in the 1930s, provoked by the Depression and its aftermath. Frankfurter
was close to the heart of the ferment. It was in this crucible that Willis
wrote The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments.
Goaded by Lord Hewart's fulminations in The New Despotism, °3
Willis searched the British statute book from 1848 onwards for evidence of
the extent of Parliament's delegation of law-making powers to departments,
and reviewed the volumes of Statutory Rules and Orders and the Law
Reports to view the departments' exercise of these "parliamentary powers."
Willis's study focused on those provisions considered the most
constitutionally odious ("the most glittering trappings of the new
99 Willis, "In my day," infra note 133 at 62.
100 Compare F.H. Lawson, The Oxford Law School, 1850-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965)
c. 5 and A.E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967) 277. See also J. Stone, "The School: A Quarter Century Retrospect"
(1957) 8 Harv. L.S. Bull. 3.
101 While Harvard Law School withstood the challenges of legal realism, several scholars opposed
legal formalism and were at least "part time" realists. Felix Frankfurter was in that group. See L.
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) at
49-56; N.E.H. Hull, "Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Realism: The Newly
Uncovered Correspondence, 1927-1931" [1987] Wis. L. Rev. 921 at 964, 967, 969.
102 See generally C.G. Haines & M.E. Dimock, eds., Essays on the Law and Practice of
Governmental Administration: A Volume in Honor of Frank Johnson Goodnow (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1935); 0. Kraines, The World and Ideas ofErnst Freund: The Searchfor General Principles
of Legislation andAdministrative Law (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1974). Freund produced
the first systematic law school casebook on administrative law in 1911. John Dickinson awaits a
biographer.
103 Gordon Hewart, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1945) [Hewart, The New
Despotism]. In a letter to Dick Risk, Willis said he read Hewart's New Despotism and some of C.K.
Allen's writings "with fury and disgust" (letter dated 4 October 1984). For a more detailed treatment
of Lord Hewart's position and Willis's counter blast, see M. Taggart, "From 'Parliamentary Powers' to
Privatization: The Chequered History of Delegated Legislation in the 20th Century" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J.
575 at 576-96.
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despotism"" 4), precisely because they were likely to give rise to
"misconceptions"'0 5 unless seen in historical perspective and in the light of
their justification and actual usage. The provisions studied included those
declaring that rules made under any Act are to have the same effect as if
they were contained in that Act ("as if enacted" clauses); those providing
that the making of any order is conclusive evidence that the requirements
of the Act have been complied with and that the order is intra vires
("conclusive evidence" clauses); and those delegating power to modify an
Act of Parliament (so-called Henry VIII clauses).
Following the realist tenet that it is the law in action that matters,
Willis said:
Bare quotation from statutes can be oddly misleading. The words of grant are not in
themselves important; it is the action taken under them which should as a practical matter
decide the case for or against such delegation.
10 6
Willis's historical treatment showed the ever-increasing reliance on
departments, which had markedly accelerated since the First World War,
and an increasing use of "novel" provisions granting delegated powers to
overcome difficulties caused by skeletal legislation.0 7 But it did not follow
from this, as Hewart had speculated, that this "[lead] to arbitrary
methods. ' °8 A detailed consideration of all the uses of "as if enacted"
clauses in British legislation from 1870 forward disclosed no cause for
alarm. 10 9 Nor did examination of the few and innocuous instances of the
exercise of powers to modify statutes justify the constitutional clamour."°
Marshalling a gang of ugly facts that beat the brains out of Hewart's
beautiful theory,"1' Willis concluded that these clauses, whose presence had
104J .Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1933) at 170 [Willis, Parliamentary Powers].
105 Ibid. at 57.
106 Ibid. See also ibid. at 152. See generally W. Rumble Jr., "Law as the Effective Decisions of
Officials: A 'New Look' at Legal Realism" (1971) 20 J. Pub. L. 215.
10 7 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 35.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid. at 101.
110 Ibid. at 152, 164.
ill Felix Frankfurter was fond of quoting Adrian Huxley's observation that many a beautiful
theory had survived long after it had had its brains beaten out by ugly facts. See F. Frankfurter,
"Foreword" (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 515 at 517.
2005]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
provided the heavy ammunition in the recent battle over the delegation of
power, had "made a noise out of all proportion to their size" or use."'
Willis pointed out the partisanship of commentators, intimating
that their opposition stemmed from the political ascendancy "for the first
time in English history [of] an avowedly Socialist Party." 1 3 Willis turned the
tables on Hewart, who had earlier castigated "[t]he apologists and
champions of the new despotism" for exhibiting "remarkable gifts of
inaccuracy"' 1 4 by demonstrating that the House of Lords had vindicated the
department concerned in every case that had come before it, often
overruling vitriolic criticism in the courts below. 15 But Willis's politics is
evident too: in his obvious support of the "social values" of the newly
elected Labour Party, and the occasional unguarded reference to
"worthless slum-owners." '16 Willis also had a fond and lifelong faith in civil
servants, describing the civil service as "the best informed and most forward
looking body of persons in England today."1 7 Willis summed up the body
politic in this way: "Parliament is the heart, the Civil Service the head and
hands, of our government."'1 8 Great store was placed in the civil servant's
expertise, 9 and it is here that Willis believed the civil service had it all over
the lawyers, who are "better versed perhaps in the constitutional learning
of the seventeenth century than in the present-day practice of
government.'
120
Thus commenced a withering critique of adjudication in
administrative law cases. Interpretations by expert officials, who in all
likelihood drafted the provisions they had to interpret and apply, were
subject to judicial override by judges who were wholly dependent on
counsels' arguments and precluded from referring to legislative history or
policy arguments, and who read the legislation "against the background of
112 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 170.
113 Ibid. at 40. The Labour Party first gained parliamentary power as a junior partner in a minority
government from January to November 1924. Defeated in the 1924 elections, Labour was out of power
until June 1929, when it formed a second minority government that lasted until August 1931. See K.
Laybourn, "Labour Party" in J. Ramsden, ed., The Oxford Companion to Twentieth-Century British
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 358.
114 Hewart, The New Despotism, supra note 103 at 91.
115 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 41.
116 Ibid. at 104.
117 Ibid. at 113. See also ibid. at 37, 40, 170.
118 Ibid. at 171.
119 Ibid. at 157.
120 Ibid. at 148.
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the Common Law," thereby "replac[ing] the assumptions of 1931 by the
assumptions of Lord Coke.
121
To Willis, what contribution courts could make to government
would always be minimal. Judicial review would always be "sporadic" and,
in any event, the judges' ignorance of policy should disqualify them from a
major role.122 Willis asked:
Granted that there must be checks and balances, why should our system of government be
conceived of as a pyramid with the courts at the apex, where even the enactments of a legally
supreme Parliament may be "construed," and the actions of the Civil Service, the best
informed and most forward looking bodf persons in England today, regulated from the
point of view of an outside jurisdiction?
In Parliamentary Powers, Willis ultimately despaired of the courts'
ability and suitability to contribute constructively to issues of government." 4
He thought the judiciary would continue to stultify Parliament "by the
arbitrary application of a long dead philosophy., 1215 In the brief "Epilogue,"
Willis suggested that administrative courts might be one solution to the
conflict between the judiciary on the one hand and the executive and
Parliament on the other. This would allow a "fresh start in a new field,
1 26
interrupting the "lawyers' s6ances with the common law., 2 7 The only
alternative to administrative courts, according to Willis, was to exclude the
courts altogether from the delegated legislation field, replacing judicial
control with parliamentary oversight.128 Perceptive reviewers of his book
questioned the implicit denial by Willis that attitudinal change on the part
of the judiciary was possible.2 9 J.A. Corry, another pioneering Canadian
administrative lawyer, thought "the astigmatism which affects judicial vision
of economic and social legislation" could be corrected by providing
a"special lens" in Acts-such as preambles, purposive declarations, and the
like-through which the judges can read the statutes "in the light of the
121 Ibid. at 171.
122 Ibid. at 112-13.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. at 173.
125 Ibid. at 172.
126 Ibid.
127 This wonderful Willisian phrase is Martin Shapiro's. See Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the
Guardians? Judicial Control ofAdministration (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988) at 28.
128 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 172.
129 Laski, "Book Review of Parliamentary Powers," supra note 77; Corry, "Book Review of
Parliamentary Powers," supra note 77.
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social and economic life in which they deal. 1 30 However, as Corry
acknowledged, this would only work if the judges became convinced that
they, and the common law canons of statutory interpretation they
administered, should move with the times.
So, in the early 1930s at Harvard, Willis consigned the courts to the
dust heap of history, too old-fashioned and set in their ways to be willing or
able to adjust to the new facts of government. This anti-judge stance can be
traced back to Bentham.13' And if the job teaching politics at the University
of London had not evaporated due to the Depression, it is likely Willis
would never have taught in a law school.1 32 Like J.A. Corry, Willis felt the
pull of political science. He read widely in that field and in the early years
at Dalhousie he was friendly with Professor Robert MacKay, a leading
Canadian political scientist of the day. 3 3 Willis described himself as a
person who tried "to talk law with a 'political science' accent.'
' 34
Willis pulled back from where a relentless critique of judging and
judges would have led him. One can see the shift from the talk in
Parliamentary Powers (1933) through "Three Approaches to Administrative
Law"(1935) to "Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938). 35 As we
have seen, Willis's distaste for judges is palpable throughout Parliamentary
Powers.136 This is the "dark stain" in Willis's work that Dick Risk has
130 Corry, ibid. at 64. See also J.A. Corry, "Administrative Law and Interpretation of Statutes"
(1935-6) 1 U.T.L.J. 286; Risk, "Volume 1," supra note 62 at 199-201. Then teaching at the oldest law
school in Western Canada-the College of Law at the University of Saskatchewan-Corry was one of
the leading administrative lawyers of his generation, although his reputation suffered from an early
move from law teaching into political science and much later into senior university administration. His
interest in administrative law was whetted by reading Lord Hewart's The New Despotism, supra note 103,
and that changed the course of his life. J.A. Corry, My Life & Work:A Happy Partnership: Memoirs ofiJA.
Cony (Kingston: Queen's University, 1981) at 63-64.
131 See generally G. Postema,Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986).
132 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Interview of George Curtis, supra note 85; J. Willis, "In my day at Dalhousie Law School"
[1976] The Ansul: Dalhousie Law Forum (Special Issue) 62 [Willis, "In my day"].
134 J. Willis, Cases and Materials on Public Authorities (1971) [unpublished, archived at Osgoode
Hall Law School Law Library] at 2 [Willis, Public Authorities]. A later version of this same text is kept
at the University of Western Ontario. See J. Willis, Cases and Materials on Public Authorities, ed. by Ian
Hunter (1979) [unpublished, archived at University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law Library]. See
also J. Willis, "Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225 at 225 [Willis,
"Retrospect"].
135 J. Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, The Conceptual, and the
Functional" (1935-36) 1 U.T.L.J. 53 [Willis, "Three Approaches"]; J. Willis, "Statute Interpretation in
a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
136 Supra note 104 at 51, 171-72.
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perceptively noted. '37 It would have been simply impossible to maintain that
stance teaching law in the oldest university law school in Canada in the
conditions that existed in the 1930s. 38 This dark stain, as Risk rightly says,
was covered over pretty quickly. George Curtis, Willis's colleague at
Dalhousie Law School from 1934-1944 and his dean at UBC from 1957-
1959, described the "Nutshell" article "as vintage Willis-not wanting to
throw out the judges but wanting to talk sense to them." '139 It was left to a
later generation of Canadian scholars to try to throw the judges out. 140
So from the mid-thirties onwards Willis made a sort of peace with
the judges. Willis chose the optimistic path that led to institutional design
and evaluation of fitness for institutional purpose or function, and put his
faith in old judicial dogs learning new tricks. 141 In this, he came around to
J.A. Corry's point of view. t42 Thereafter the major themes in Willis's
scholarship were minimizing the judicial role in government, 43 exhorting
judges to do better in the small area of vires which was rightly theirs, 144 and
137
Risk, "Volume 1," supra note 62 at 203. To the extent that Willis accepted the notion of
subjectivity in judicial decision-making (see Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 80) he was
susceptible to the criticism leveled at American legal realists, that this led to judicial despotism, a
government of men not laws, and hence was anti-democratic. It is difficult to see in Willis's work,
however, any support for the ethical relativism that attracted the broader criticism that legal realism
paved the way for totalitarianism. These "dark sides" of legal realism, as portrayed by the critics in the
1930s and early 1940s, are expertly laid bare in Edward A. Purcell, "American Jurisprudence between
the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory" (1969) 75 Am. Hist. Rev. 424.
138 It is a secret of the commonplace that "the sine qua non" of the professional mission of legal
training is "training lawyers." See D.R. Ernst, "The Lost Law Professor" (1996) 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry
967 at 979.
139 Interview of George Curtis, supra note 85. Accord, R. Risk, "Here Be Cold and Tygers: A Map
of Statutory Interpretation in Canada in the 1920s and 1930s" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 194 at 205 [Risk,
"Cold and Tygers"]: "Nothing [Willis] said was at odds with the idea that the job of interpretation could
be done differently or better."
140 Harry Arthurs said more than sixty years after Parliamentary Powers that "the agency of judges"
is "the Achilles' heel of law." See H.W. Arthurs, "'Mechanical Arts and Merchandise': Canadian Public
Administration in the New Economy" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 29 at 47 [Arthurs, "Mechanical Arts"].
141 Supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
142 Supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
143 Willis said judges should think of themselves as "civil servants in the Department of Dispute
Resolution": quoted in H. Arthurs, "Woe Unto You, Judges: or How Reading Frankfurter and Greene,
The Labor Injunction, Ruined Me as a Labour Lawyer and Made Me as an Academic" (2002) 29 J.L.
& Soc'y 657 at 665, n. 22 [Arthurs, "Woe Unto You, Judges"]. See also J. Willis, "What I Like and What
I Don't Like About Lawyers" (1969) 76 Queen's Q. 1 at 4.
144 J. Willis, "Correspondence: More on the Nolan Case" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 580 at 581:
"Something can and should be done by the judges about this gap" between "the twentieth century
constitution" and "the ideologies of a late seventeenth century constitution" [Willis, "Nolan Case"].
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studying the workings of the important tribunals and agencies.'45 In that
latter respect, he thought making broad statements about "boards in
general" was futile,'46 and advocated what he later called the "principle of
uniqueness.' ' 147 By the late 1950s, Willis had abandoned the idea of creating
administrative courts, saying they would be "unfamiliar to most Canadians
and [do] not seem very suitable to our conditions., 148
During the Second World War, Willis edited a collection of essays
entitled Canadian Boards at Work 1 4 9 that was decades ahead of its time in
Canada. 150 Willis's stated ambition was empirical-to describe "what
Canadian boards in fact do" and how they "go about their daily business. ,'51
The collection treated the administrative process "as a phenomenon in its
own right, and not [as] a bastard or run-away version of the judicial
process.', 152 It was only in the 1970s that the Law Reform Commission of
Canada picked up where Willis's pioneering collection left off. The
Commission stated in 1973
that too little is known about the workings of administrative tribunals, [and] that the practice
of a tribunal cannot be understood without reference to its context and [that] the legal
framework for a tribunal makes little sense without an understanding of its practices.
53
Consequently, the Commission embarked upon a series of valuable
case studies in order to provide information upon which reform could be
145 Risk, "Volume 1," supra note 62 at 202-03. This emphasis on tribunals and agencies as a
separate genus is completely at odds with the mainstream, Diceyan scholarship that refused to recognize
"boards or tribunals as a functional category" and persisted in wrapping them indistinguishably with all
"inferior bodies." See Roach, "D.M. Gordon," supra note 33 at 20.
146 J. Willis, "Foreword" in J. Willis, ed., Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941)
at viii [Willis, "Foreword"].
147 Willis, "The McRuer Report," supra note 42 at 360.
148 J. Willis, "Administrative Decision and the Law: The Canadian Implications of the Franks
Report" (1959) 13 U.T.L.J. 45 at 55.
149 J. Willis, ed., Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941).
150 See G.B. Doern, "Preface" in G.B. Doern, ed., The Regulatory Process in Canada (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1978) at i. It had contemporary parallels in England, however. See R.S.W. Pollard, ed.,
Administrative Tribunals at Work (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949); W.A. Robson, ed., Public Enterprise:
Developments in Social Ownership and Control in Great Britain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd,
1937).
151 Willis, "Foreword," supra note 146 at viii.
152 S. Wexler, "Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of Law" (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 120 at 126, n.
16.
153 Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Worst Form of Tyranny: SecondAnnual Report 1972-
73 (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1973) at 24.
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based. 154 That ambition is of a piece with Willis's. But, as with many of his
insights, Willis never did the work to take it anywhere himself. Canadian
Boards at Work contained no board study by him, and he never focused
attention on any particular board in his later writing. 5 5 He preached the
principle of uniqueness but did not practice it in his published work.
One can see the same pattern with his strong interest in sanctions.
Willis was fascinated by enforcement, with "what actually happens.' 156 He
had plans approved for a seminar course on sanctions: studying the
problem of translating policy into action through law, with emphasis on
methods of enforcement and their efficacy. In the proposal to the
University of Toronto Law School curriculum committee, Willis was
disarmingly frank about his doubts as to his ability to pull such a course off,
but wanted to give it a go and to get it out of his system. "I shall learn
something even if the students don't," he said.1 51 Unfortunately, as he told
his students in his 1971 administrative law teaching materials, he
abandoned the seminar proposal as being too difficult to carry out.'58 Once
again, Willis was before his time in Canada. Socio-legal studies of
enforcement started to appear a decade or so after he retired.
159
Willis shared this fascination with sanctions and focus on
institutional competence-the institution best fit for the job should
154 Reports were produced on the Immigration Appeal Board, the Atomic Energy Control Board,
the National Parole Board, the Unemployment Insurance Commission, the Canadian Transport
Commission, the Canadian Radio-Television and Communications Commission, the Canada Labour
Relations Board, and the Tariff Board. Unfortunately, the Commission did not succeed in pulling
together that work in any productive way.
155 He was one of a three-man committee that inquired into the Ontario Securities Commission.
See Ontario Securities Commission, Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on
the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by Business Combinations and Private Placements
(Toronto: Dept. of Financial and Commercial Affairs, 1970). Willis also served part-time for a period
on the Ontario Securities Commission.
156J. Willis, Book Review of Enforcing the Law by R.M. Jackson (1968) 18 U.T.L.J. 98 [Willis,
"Review of Enforcing the Law"].
157 Willis, Public Authorities, supra note 134 at 7 [emphasis in original].
158 Ibid. He did review admiringly R.M. Jackson'sEnforcingthe Law (London: Macmillan, 1967),
which was a pioneering book in its day. See Willis, "Review of Enforcing the Law," supra note 156. He
reveals the difficulty of the contextual, interdisciplinary task for lawyers in another admiring review of
a book by an economist on water pollution control. See J. Willis, Book Review of Pollution, Property and
Prices by J.H. Dales (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 277.
159 See e.g. M.J. Trebilcock et al., The Choice of Goveming Instrument (Ottawa: Economic Council
of Canada, 1982); K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of
Pollution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984); B. Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law? The Law
Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); M.L.
Friedland, ed., Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
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decide-with adherents of the legal process school in the United States and
Canada.1 60 This school of legal thought is associated particularly with
Harvard and the famously unpublished "Legal Process" materials for a
course taught by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.161 This approach was highly
influential in Canada due to the fact that, for most of the twentieth century,
a Harvard LL.M. was "the union card" for entry into the law teaching
profession in Canada. 162 In the United States, the legal process school is
credited with beating back the darker side of legal realism for the best part
of two generations. 63 Although the exact contours of the legal process
school are almost as disputed as those of legal realism, Willis would have
been comfortable with the process school's minimization of the judicial role
and its emphasis on judicial restraint. He would, however, have scorned as
theological its emphasis on impersonal, durable, and neutral principles, in
the same way his "hero" Thurman Arnold did.' 6' Willis was too much a
square peg to fit the round holes of the legal process school, and this
distinguishes him from his good friends and colleagues Caesar Wright and
Bora Laskin.165
C. The Influence of the Teacher-Scholar
Willis was passionate about writing, which he thought was an
academic's first and true duty. He thought if academics put their teaching
160 The writing on the legal process school is large. For an introduction, see W.N. Eskridge, Jr.
& P.P. Frickey, "The Making of The LegalProcess" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031. For a Canadian take
see K. Roach, "What's New and Old about The Legal Process?" (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 363.
161 A 1958 tentative edition of Hart and Sacks was published posthumously. See Henry M. Hart
& Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making andApplication of Law, ed. by W.N.
Eskridge & P.P. Frickey (Westbury: Foundation Press, 1994).
162 Willis, History, supra note 55 at 88. See also P. Horwitz, "Bora Laskin and the Legal Process
School" (1995) 59 Sask. L.R. 77; Paul C. Weiler, "Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making" (1968) 46
Can. Bar Rev. 406 (Weiler later left Canada to teach at Harvard Law School).
163 See e.g. G.E. White, "The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change" (1973) 59 Va. L.R. 279.
164 For an entree to the neutral principles debate, see G. Peller, "Neutral Principles in the 1950s"
(1988) 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 561. For Arnold's critique, see T. Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology"
(1960) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1311. Willis's admiration is evident from his reviews of Arnold's realist tracts,
autobiography and edited correspondence. See J. Willis, Book Review of The Symbols of Government
by Thurman W. Arnold (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 1; J. Willis, Book Review of The Folklore of Capitalism
by Thurman W. Arnold (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 417; J. Willis, Book Review of Fair Fights and Foul: A
Dissenting Lawyer's Life by Thurman Arnold (1967) 17 U.T.L.J. 231 [Willis, "Book Review of Fair
Fights"]; and Willis, "Book Review of Voltaire," supra note 60.
165 See generally R.B. Brown, "Cecil A. Wright and the Foundations of Canadian Tort Law
Scholarship" (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 169 [Brown, "Cecil A. Wright"]; Horwitz, supra note 162.
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first, they "become ... just a high school teacher masquerading as a
university professor."'' 66 He often lamented that the then-state of legal
education in Canada forced him and his generation of law teachers "against
its will" to "put teaching first.', 167 It is true that he taught a remarkable
range of courses. Bora Laskin doubted "that any other full-time teacher, at
a time when the curriculum was limited and structured, exhibited his
command of as many subjects," and compiled this list of his most important
teaching subjects: "administrative (and constitutional) law; history of
English law; equity (including mortgages and sale of land); bills of exchange
and promissory notes; statute law; taxation; wills and trusts., 168 Indeed,
Willis's characterized himself as "a public lawyer in embryo who had to
teach other things and so never got a chance to develop into anything.
1 69
Typically self-deprecating, but wrong.
The first thing to say is that, by every account, Willis was a
"superlative" teacher.' His case book on administrative law was used at
some Ontario law schools well into the 1980s and is still worth reading. 7'
Everyone who knew Willis as a teacher or colleague says that to see the
man teach or to talk to him was even more vivid and invigorating than his
writing, which is no small claim.
An early exponent of what we now call "research-informed"
teaching, some of his classic articles flowed from teaching preparation or
166 j. Willis, "Convocation Address, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University" (1973) 7 L.
Soc'y Gaz. 235 at 236.
167 Ibid.
168 Laskin, "Foreword," supra note 61.
169 Letter from J. Willis to M. Taggart (14 January 1989).
170 D.A. Soberman, Book Review of A History of Dalhousie Law School by John Willis (1980) 6
Dal. L.J. 711 at 711. See also I. Hunter, Book Review of A History of Dalhousie Law School by John
Willis (1981) 19 U.W.O. L. Rev. 387 at 388-89; H.W. Arthurs, Book Review of A History ofDalhousie
Law School by John Willis (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 232. Ian Hunter, who revered Willis as a teacher,
said once in a letter something that encapsulates everything I have heard or read about his teaching over
more than twenty years: "He had the most fecund mind, thought for himself, and taught like a volcano
about to erupt." See Letter from Ian Hunter to M. Taggart (14 September 1988).
171 Willis, Public Authorities, supra note 134 at 2. Eventually these materials were supplanted by
the work product of a new generation of Canadian administrative law scholars. See J.M. Evans, H.N.
Janisch, R.C.B. Risk & D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 5th ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2003) [Evans etal.,Administrative Law]. Of the authors (for they are much more
than editors and compilers), John Evans (Osgoode Hall, and before that LSE) became a judge of the
Federal Court, Dick Risk (Toronto) is in active retirement, Hudson Janisch (Toronto) retired this year,
and David Mullan (Queen's) took early retirement this year, and is currently the Integrity
Commissioner for the City of Toronto. Who are the successors?
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from making sense of puzzles thrown up by teaching.172 Despite the obvious
connections, there is a tension between teaching and scholarship (writing)
simply because there are only so many hours in the day and the demands
of one cut across the doing of the other. By which route is one (and one's
institution) more influential? This is an old question. The answer is less
clear in Willis's case than in many others.
His writings were read around the common law world, and long
after they were written. For instance, I read his famous "Nutshell" piece
(1938) and the one on delegatus nonpotest delegare (1943) in the mid-1970s
half the world away from its source. I was taught by Jack Northey, who had
studied at the University of Toronto in the early 1950s. I am told by
Laskin's biographer Philip Girard that Northey was one of Bora Laskin's
most memorable postgraduate students.173 This proves once again that
taught law is tough law and that the world of legal education is a small one.
At that time, it was minute. When the Association of Canadian Law
Teachers was formed in 1950 the full-time law teachers across Canada
numbered forty.
174
This illustrates some of the difficulties of measuring influence. 171 It
appears from colleagues' and students' reminiscences and writings that
Willis was highly influential as a teacher. He goaded thousands of students
over more than forty years into critical thought, many of whom enjoyed and
benefited from the experience. Willis's teaching and writings influenced
other teachers, who used his writings in their teaching and writing, and so
on. No citation index can capture this influence. 176
So much for teaching, then; how can we trace the influences upon
Willis's own thinking and the influence of his scholarship on others?
172 Dick Risk recalls that the 1938 classic "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" "was written
during the summer of 1937 for the students in a new course on legislation" at Dalhousie Law School:
Risk, "Memoriam," supra note 62 at 302.
See supra note *. Jack Northey completed his S.J.D at the University of Toronto in the early
1950s under Bora Laskin's supervision. Further evidence of the "small world" thesis (taken from the
title of a David Lodge novel about academic life) is that Philip Girard and I started teaching law at the
University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law in 1980.
174 Bale, "W.R. Lederman," supra note 49 at 57.
On the difficulties of determining influence in law in general and in administrative law in
particular, see e.g. R.A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990); N. Duxbury, Jurists & Judges. An Essay on Influence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001); R.A. Cass
& J.M. Beermann, "Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The Impact of Scholarship on Administrative
Law" (1993) 45 Admin. L. Rev. 1. For the more stringent requirements of intellectual historians in
identifying positive influence on subsequent writers, see Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding
in the History of Ideas" (1969) 8 History and Theory 25.
176 For use and advocacy of quantitative citation survey to determine influence and reputation,
see Posner, ibid. at 71, 149.
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Textual study of scholarship looks first and foremost at the text for overt or
covert signs of influences. Scholarly writing has the advantage that there are
the footlights of footnotes, illuminating sources of thought.177 But the
etiquette of footnoting is a rather personal matter and varies also over time
and place. Willis was never flashy, and wore his considerable learning
lightly on his sleeve. His footnotes were largely black letter and to the
point.'78 As his former student and Dalhousie colleague, Graham Murray
observed:
Some writers of legal articles, write them, of course, to display the learning they possess.
John Willis, in all his writing, does, perhaps, the reverse. He skillfully conceals the magnitude' ' .' . . 179
of his researches into the law, in the books as well as in action.
We know Willis to be well-read outside law and to have rubbed
shoulders at Dalhousie University with political scientists and economists, 80
but none of that is traceable from his writing. There are a great many gaps
to fill, and the bigger the gaps the greater the danger of inaccuracy.
Similarly, when trying to establish what sort of reputation and
influence Willis had, we are once again largely at the mercy of footnotes.
Fortunately, others were less Delphic than Willis, and his "classic" articles
are so described by scholars in their work. There were few administrative
law books published at that time, but Willis's articles were invariably cited.
For most of the period in which Willis wrote, judges did not cite academics'
work, 8t at least not the works of scholars who were still alive. 182 From what
177 Much has been written on footnotes in many disciplines, including law. See generally A.
Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (London: Faber & Faber, 1997).
1 78 In a reminiscence of law teaching at Dalhousie University in the 1930s Willis did say this: "Our
attitude to scholarship was devoted but light-hearted. I particularly remember how ... [he and a
colleague, who shared an office] competed with one another in the number of footnotes (which, and
rightly, we regarded with derision) we could squash into our respective pieces of learning." See Willis,
"In my day," supra note 133 at 64.
179R. Graham Murray, "In my day at Dalhousie Law School" (1976) Ansul: Dalhousie Law
Forum (Special Issue) 67 at 67.
180 Willis, "In my day," supra note 133.
181 R.B. Brown makes this point also that the lack of judicial citation hinders an evaluation of
academic influence. See Brown, "Cecil A. Wright," supra note 165 at 215.
182 The convention that the work of living authors is not authoritative persisted well into the
twentieth century. See Duxbury, supra note 175 at 62-84; Bale, "W.R. Lederman," supra note 49 at 49-
55; and B.M. Komar, "Textbooks as Authority in Anglo-American Law" (1922-23) 11 Cal. L. Rev. 397.
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we know of the reactions of practitioners, they were aghast at Willis's plain
speaking and his left-of-centre politics. 183 Dick Risk concludes that Willis's
writing had little influence in its own times. The courts and practicing lawyers either ignored
him or considered him a dangerous radical .... The greatest understanding and influence of
his writing came long after the 1930s, and my impression is that the expansion of visions of
legal scholarship during the past decade [the 1970s] has made teachers and students respond
more enthusiastically to it than they did during the 1950s and 1960s.'
84
Willis's major influence was on his students and his colleagues, and
through his teaching and theirs he influenced the thinking of literally
thousands of students, many of whom went on to practice law and some of
whom became judges or academics.
One of the reasons for the impact and influence of Willis's work is
his fluid and memorable writing style. The rigours of a classical education
are evident in the clarity and precision of expression, but this is mixed in
good proportion with verve, passion, and wit. Someone once said of his
mentor Frankfurter's writing that it "crackles, ,t8 and that seems to me to
describe exactly much of Willis's writing as well. Many an academic career
has been launched upon a good turn of phrase, and Willis was never short
of a memorable one. My favourites from Parliamentary Powers include: "it
is here that the constitutional shoe pinches"; 186 "[t]he 'intent of Parliament'
is not that shy modest virgin with whom the judges sometimes like to flirt;
the department concerned knows her well";1 87 "[l]awyers' ears are attuned
to the accents of the forgotten past, new commands are faintly
apprehended through the fog of the Common Law"; 188 "all these factors
combined to give the courts leave to treat the case as Jack Horner's
Christmas Pie, to 'put in a thumb and pull out a plum and say what a good
183 See e.g. W.H. Jost, "The Days of John Willis," Hearsay (Fall 1991) 30 at 31-32, the vitriolic
tone of the responses to Willis's highly critical comment on the Nolan case, and Willis's surrebutter in
Willis, "Nolan Case," supra note 144 at 572, 573, 580,708. Willis's position was vindicated on appeal to
the Privy Council when the Supreme Court of Canada was overturned. See Attorney-General v. Hallett
& Carey [1952], A.C. 427 (P.C.).
184 Risk, "Tribute," supra note 33 at 549-50. Compare Brown, "Canadian Legal Realists," supra
note 60 at 170-72.
185 Quoted by A.M. Bickel, "Applied Politics and the Science of Law: Writings of the Harvard
Period" in W. Mendelson, ed., Felix Frankfurter: A Tribute (New York: Reynal & Company, 1964) 164
at 198. Dick Risk has spoken of Willis's "wit and sparkle." See Risk, "Memoriam," supra note 62 at 303.
Willis compared Frankfurter's writing to a "darting, shimmering dragonfly." See Willis, "Review of Mr.
Justice Holmes," supra note 72.
186 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 4.
187 Ibid. at 34.
188 Ibid. at 51.
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boy am I'";189 "[q]uestions of government cannot be settled by drawing
analogies from the behaviour of a pickpocket when the policeman is off his
beat";' 90 and finally, "[i]n the Never-never Land of legal formalism it may
well be that phrases coined some fifty years ago by way of incisive
generalisation for the use of undergraduates should pass as unalterable
canons of good government. '19 In Canada, in the relevant period, Willis's
skill as a wordsmith was arguably rivaled only by his University of Toronto
colleague, Albert Abel.192
D. Court Scepticism, Labour Law, and Deference
In the twentieth century, some administrative lawyers were highly
sceptical of the utility of judicial review in the social and economic spheres.
The most articulate early spokespersons of that view worked at the London
School of Economics in the 1920s; the honour roll includes Harold Laski,
William A. Robson, and Ivor Jennings.
These LSE scholars were instrumental in forging a distinctive,
dissenting view of administrative law in Britain.' 93 Their work "was of a
strongly functionalist, often empiricist character and was special in being
administration- rather than solely court-centred."' 94 The impact of legal
realism was plainly evident too. This "tradition of dissent" manifested itself
in the teaching of labour law decades ahead of other British law schools. 95
These left-leaning scholars were deeply resentful of what they saw
as conservative judges twisting the pliable rules of statutory interpretation
to favour the existing order, privileging the rich and the powerful, and
defeating the purposes of statutes intended to further the interests of the
workers, the homeless, and the least well-off in society. This antagonism
189 Ibid. at 76.
190 Ibid. at 104.
191 Ibid. at 176. See also Willis, "Review of Mr. Justice Holmes," supra note 72.
192 Abel strikes me as an interesting candidate for contextualized intellectual historical study.
Headhunted by Bora Laskin from the University of West Virginia, he became known primarily as a
constitutional law scholar at the University of Toronto, but wrote also about administrative law in often
non-traditional ways. It seems to me Abel never reaped the fame his intellect deserved.
193 See generally Harlow & Rawlings, Law and Administration, supra note 26; Loughlin, supra
notes 11 and 27.
194 R. Rawlings, "Distinction and Diversity: Law and the LSE" in R. Rawlings, ed., Law, Society
and Economy: Centenary Essays for the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895-1995
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 1 at 7.
195 Ibid. at 10.
2005]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
can be traced back to the lamentable treatment of trade unions by the
Courts.' 96
As we have seen, Willis shared in spades the LSE scholars'
scepticism about judges. Indeed, as an English born and bred and public-
school trained social democrat, he carried these scepticisms to New
England and then to Canada. His concerns about the role of the courts in
judicial review were always "more general" than just in respect of the
labour field.1 97 Somewhat surprisingly, unlike his friend Bora Laskin, Willis
never taught labour law. And, apart from the odd reference to the
irresponsible performance of some Canadian courts in reviewing provincial
labour boards,'98 Willis did not dwell on labour law in his writing either.
This was not the case with the generation of scholars after Willis, who took
many of his insights and applied them specifically to labour law.
It was mainly in labour law that the "dark stain" (of law without
judges' 99 that we saw in the earliest work of Willis) appears in the work of
other scholars. Bora Laskin in the 1950s supported the use of privative
clauses in labour legislation to keep the courts out. 00 Harry Arthurs, a
student of Laskin's, turned this disposition into a "general campaign against
any role whatsoever for courts in industrial relations-either original or
reviewing."' 0 ' A group of scholars-some labour lawyers, some
administrative lawyers-based at Osgoode Hall Law School loudly took up
this cause, and largely succeeded in giving judicial review a bad name.20 2 In
addition to Harry Arthurs, °3 this group in the 1960s included Paul
196 This distrust continued into the 1990s in the UK. See F. Belloni, "The Labour Community and
the British Judiciary" (1992) 13 Int'l Pol. Sci. Rev. 269. For the position in Canada, see Judy Fudge &
Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001).
1 9 7 D.J. Mullan, "Reform of Judicial Review of Administrative Action-the Ontario Way" (1974)
12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125 at 127.
198 By this Willis meant without proper understanding and restraint. See Willis, "Nolan Case,"
supra note 144 at 585.
199
Taggart, "Reinvented Government," supra note 26 at 136.
200 B. Laskin, "Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses" (1952)
30 Can. Bar Rev. 986.
201 Arthurs, "Woe Unto You, Judges," supra note 143 at 665.
202 D. J. Mullan, "Judicial Restraints on Administrative Action: Effective or Illusory?" (1976) 17
C. de D. 913 at 924 [Mullan, "Judicial Restraints"]; H. Janisch, "Bora Laskin and Administrative Law:
An Unfinished Journey" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 557 at 578 [Janisch, "Bora Laskin"].
203 See e.g. H.W. Arthurs, "Protection against Judicial Review" (1983) 43 R. du B. 277; H.W.
Arthurs, "'Dullest Bill': Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia" (1974) 9 U.B.C. L. Rev.
280. Of all the scholars in this rather loose grouping Harry Arthurs is the most readily identifiable
successor to Willis's thought and approach. Accord, Gordon, "Without the Law II,"supra note 65 at 431.
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Weiler,20 4 Terry Ison,20 5 Harry Glasbeek, Bill Angus,206 and to a lesser
extent, Peter Hogg and, a little later on, John Evans.0 7 Some in the
Osgoode Hall camp repudiated the courts altogether-Terry Ison, for
example 21 8- while Harry Arthurs has flitted in and out of that part of the
camp for much of his career. 20 9 Most of the others stopped short of
dismissing the courts out of hand, but directed their withering critiques
toward minimizing the judicial role and defining the small compass within
which judicial intervention in the administrative process was both justifiable
and desirable. In this, they followed in the footsteps of John Willis.
In 1951 Willis put this most clearly in a letter to the Editor of the
Canadian Bar Review, replying to two blistering responses to an ill-
tempered article of his own. Accused of wanting to get rid of judicial
control of administrative action, Willis replied:
I am not quite sure where I stand on judicial control of administrative action and in any case
the question is so complicated and so hedged about with ifs and ans [sic] that I do not
propose to enter into it at the end of what is already a Gargantuan letter. But there are ...
[some] things of which I am absolutely sure.
... I am absolutely sure that I do not want to get rid of the doctrine of ultra vires... .I do not
think that "the judicial process is outmoded and inadequate to deal with the realities of
204 See e.g. Paul C. Weiler, "The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention" (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 1; Paul C. Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1974) [Weiler, Last Resort]; and Paul C. Weiler, "The Administrative Tribunal: A View from
the Inside" (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 225.
205 See e.g. T.G. Ison, "The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1986) 10 Adel. L.R. 1 [Ison,
"Sovereignty"]; T.G. Ison, "The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1986) 26 C. de D. 503; and T.G. Ison,
"Appeals on the Merits" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 139.
206 W.H. Angus, "The Waning Jurisdiction of the Courts" (1963) 28 Sask. L. Rev. 133.
207 See e.g. P.W. Hogg, "The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada: Bell
v. Ontario Human Rights Commission" (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 203 [Hogg, "Jurisdictional Fact
Doctrine"]; P.W. Hogg, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-1971" (1973)
11 Osgoode Hall L.J. 187 [Hogg, "The Supreme Court"]; P.W. Hogg, "Is Judicial Review of
Administrative Action Guaranteed by the British North America Act?" (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 716.
John Evans, who edited the fourth edition of S.A. de Smith's Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1980), visited Osgoode Hall in 1974 and moved there permanently from the
LSE in 1975. For an overview of his approach, see J.M. Evans, "Administrative Appeal or Judicial
Review: A Canadian Perspective" [1993] Acta Jur. 47.
208 See supra note 205. Ison's heir apparent is Allan Hutchinson. See A.C. Hutchinson, "The Rise
and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985) 48 Mod. L. Rev. 293.
209 "Judicial review has always been too slow, costly, clumsy, incoherent and unpredictable to be
much use to anyone." See Arthurs, "Mechanical Arts," supra note 140 at 52. See also Arthurs, "A
Slightly Dicey Business," supra note 11 at 42: "Judicial review has only a limited useful role." Outside
labour law, I am not aware that Arthurs ever said that judicial review was never any use to anyone and
should be abolished.
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"modern socialistic legislation"'. What I am saying is something quite different. I am asking
... that the judges in administering the law of ultra vires exercise this exceedingly delicate
power with understanding and restraint; for it is the power to interfere with the normal
functioning of a overnment system of which in these democratic days they are the least
important arm.
As Peter Hogg put it years later, "[t]he answer-vague,
unsatisfactory and unenforceable though it may be-is that the courts
should exercise restraint" in the application of the jurisdictional principle.211
In the early 1970s a series of annual lectures was held at Osgoode Hall Law
School that were published under the title The Individual and Bureaucracy.
As part of that series, Bill Angus asked "Judicial Review: Do We Need It?"
and Peter Hogg's contribution was subtitled "How Much Do We Need?
2 12
These articles were republished in law reviews on both sides of the border
and brought together neatly many of the strands of the contemporary
critique of judicial review. Like Willis, they argued that for a variety of
reasons the courts should have a minor and restrained role in judicial
review.
Peter Hogg, drawing on American administrative law,213 made more
headway than Willis ever did in articulating when courts should show
restraint. In his prescient article, Hogg proposed that any reasonable
interpretation by an administrative tribunal should prevail, unless it
offended general or fundamental values of the legal order.214 The courts'
true role was to guarantee the protection of those fundamental values,
210 Willis, "Nolan Case," supra note 144 at 584-85.
211
Hogg, "Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine," supra note 207 at 216. Hogg was speaking of the
jurisdictional fact doctrine, but it applies equally to all jurisdictional errors. Willis thought this long
letter to the editor, in reply to critics, was "by miles" the best thing he ever wrote. See Letter from J.
Willis to M. Taggart (14 January 1989). See also H.W. Arthurs, "Without the Law"AdministrativeJustice
and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 190
("judicial restraint now rests on no more than a self-denying ordinance") [Arthurs, Without the Law].
212 The lecture series was published as Daniel J. Baum, ed., The Individual and the Bureaucracy
(Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1975). The articles by Angus and Hogg were
republished in the McGill Law Journal and the Administrative Law Review. See W.H. Angus, "The
Individual and the Bureaucracy: Judicial Review-Do We Need It?" (1974) 20 McGill L.J. 177; W.H.
Angus, "Judicial Review in Canada: Do We Need It?" (1974) 26 Admin. L.Rev. 301; Baum, ibid. at 101;
P.W. Hogg, "Judicial Review: How Much do We Need?" in Baum, ibid. at 81, republished as P.W.
Hogg, "Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need It?" (1974) 20 McGill L.J. 157; P.W. Hogg, "Judicial
Review in Canada: How Much Do We Need It?" (1974) 26 Admin. L. R. Rev. 337. I will cite to Baum.
213 Hogg in Baum, ibid. at 92, citing K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (St. Paul: West Pub.
Co., 1958) vol. 4 at s. 30.05, and comparing it with L.L. Jaffe, Judicial Control ofAdministrative Action
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). Hogg correctly portrays Jaffe as advocating a stronger, more
interventionist approach. See generally D.B. Rodriguez, "Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual
Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory" (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1159.
214 Hogg, ibid. at 91 ("civil libertarian values").
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reflecting "the Canadian commitment to a democracy based on the English
parliamentary system,, 215 and that entailed curial enforcement of the
requirement that official action be authorized by positive law and the
protection of civil liberties.
This tension between legal centrism and pluralism is longstanding.
The Victorians conceived of the law as "a whole, unified, integrated
thing, 216 with the courts at the top "fully competent to administer the whole
law., 217 This is one of the premises upon which Dicey built his rule of law.
This legacy is with us still, and the pull towards coherence across the whole
legal landscape is very strong.218 It is vital to remember, however,
notwithstanding the potent symbolism of "ordinary" courts atop the
interpretive heap administering the "ordinary" law,219 that historically the
courts never claimed to determine conclusively the meaning of all "law.,
221
The concept of jurisdiction operated as a saw cutting off those questions
that the courts would subject to a "correctness" standard of review from
those it left to the administrators. In Harry Arthurs' words, the concept of
jurisdiction operated as a mediating principle, mediating between the
ordinary law and the distinctive, special laws of the administration 22 and
thereby leaving room, within jurisdiction, for pluralism to survive, if not
flourish.
215 Hogg, ibid. at 88-89. Hogg quoted and relied upon Jaffe, ibid. at 589 for the proposition that
the court is "guarantor of the integrity of the legal system." When push came to shove at a conference
where the Hogg-Angus articles were rerun, David Mullan fell back on Jaffe's views to defend the
availability of judicial review against abuse of power: Mullan, "Judicial Restraints," supra note 202 at
925. Sir William Wade expressed this view most memorably in a commentary following one by Harry
Arthurs, when he said "[h]owever conscientious the tribunals themselves may be, there is a real risk of
letting loose a legal Frankenstein's monster." See H.W. Arthurs, "Judicial Review-Comment" in Peter
A. Gall, ed., Proceedings of the Administrative Law Conference, Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, 18-19 October 1979 (Vancouber: U.B.C. L. Rev., 1981) 375 at 377.
216 S. Wexler, "The Forms of Action and Administrative Law" in Gall, ibid. 292 at 295.
21 7 Frederic William Maitland, A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker, The Forms ofAction at Common
Law: A Course of Lectures (Cambridge: The University Press, 1958) at 10, quoted by Wexler, ibid.
218 See generally R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); M.
Allars, "On Deference to Tribunals, with Deference to Dworkin" (1994) 20 Queen's L.J. 163; W.N.
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 239.
219 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1959) at c. 4.
220 Recall the valiant but quixotic attempt by the Canadian legal practitioner, D. M. Gordon, to
define and confine jurisdictional control. See generally Roach, "D.M. Gordon," supra note 33.
221 Arthurs, Without the Law, supra note 211 at 208-09.
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E. Doctrinal Influences
An outsider looking in on contemporary Canadian administrative
law is struck by several distinctive features."22 First, until very recently, by
the muted role that the doctrine of reasonableness has played in the control
of discretionary power.2 3 Second, that Canadian courts clung to the
concept of jurisdictional error as the central organizing principle longer
than most Commonwealth courts, and its displacement by the "pragmatic
and functional" test is not yet complete.224 Third, the Canadian courts have
adopted a decidedly deferential attitude towards administrative
interpretations of statutes in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Part
and parcel of that development is a respectful and finely calibrated
treatment of privative clauses. These features are interrelated and all may
be traced back in one way or another to Willis's thought and writings.
Perhaps the most famous Canadian administrative law case since
1960,25 and certainly the most symbolically important, is CUPE v. New
222 I draw in this section on some previous work. See M. Taggart, "Outside Canadian
Administrative Law" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 649; M. Taggart, "The Contribution of Lord Cooke to Scope
of Review Doctrine in Administrative Law: A Comparative Common Law Perspective" in P. Rishworth,
ed., The Struggle for Simplicity in Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thomdon (Wellington: Butterworths,
1997) 189 at 204-07.
223 See D.J. Mullan,Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 121-22. That is, until Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. For wide ranging consideration of the
implications of that case, see D. Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2004) and especially D.J. Mullan, "Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond-Interpreting the
Conflicting Signals" in Dyzenhaus, ibid. at 21, 28, 36.
224 One reason for this is that the right to judicial review on jurisdictional grounds has been held
to be enshrined in, and protected by, the judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30
& 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. See Crevierv. Attorney-General of Quebec, [1981]
2 S.C.R. 220. 1 accept that after Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 "jurisdictional error" became (or should have become) simply an expost description
whenever the "pragmatic and functional" test pointed towards correctness, but subsequent cases have
begun to muddy the waters. See R. Lechey, "Territoriality in Canadian Administrative Law" (2004) 54
U.T.L.J. 327 at 341-43.
225 1960 is chosen because pride of place, in my opinion, goes to Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959]
S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli]. Although there is much interesting commentary in several disciplines about the
treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses in Quebec, the context within which the particular dispute unfolded,
its judicial resolution and the aftermath, Roncarelli cries out for a contextualized book length treatment
d la Simpson. For further explanation as to what it means "to do a Simpson," see O'Donovan & Rubin,
"Introduction," supra note 35. Willis would surely have approved of this as he spent a lot of time on
Roncarelli in his teaching materials and included extracts from Charles Reich (United States), Edward
McWhinney (Canada), Gordon Borrie (U.K.), Paul C. Weiler (Canada) and Amnon Rubinstein
(Israel). See Willis, Public Authorities, supra note 134 at 1-59(g)-159(i), 1-59(n)-1-61, 1-61-1-63, 1-63-1-
63(a), 1-63(a)-1-64.
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Brunswick Liquor Corporation.26 Prior to CUPE, the Supreme Court of
Canada employed a "correctness" standard of review determining for itself
"perfectly simple, short and neat" questions of law without deference to the
agency's interpretation.227 In CUPE, the Court combined a narrow concept
of jurisdictional error with a decidedly deferential attitude toward
administrative interpretations of statutes; this left many issues of statutory
interpretation to the agency, whose view was to prevail unless "patently
unreasonable."
It seems clear that the Court in CUPE was reacting principally to
sustained and severe academic criticism that the Court was too
interventionist and unprincipled in the area of judicial review.228 Much of
the discontent stemmed from the Court's perceived lack of sympathy for
organized labour, but this "spotty record" in the labour relations area gave
judicial review more generally a "bad name" in Canada.229 Several scholars
thought that the facts did not justify this "bad press" in the labour area,
while another said that the "outcries from labour lawyers at excessive and
ill-conceived judicial intervention" had "all but drowned out calls for a
positive dialogue" between courts and administrative agencies in Canada.23 °
226 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 [CUPE].
227 For a convenient overview, see C. L'Heureux-Dub6, "The 'Ebb' and 'Flow' of Administrative
Law on the 'General Question of Law' in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 308 at 309-11 [Taggart, Province ofAdministrative Law]. The reference
to "perfectly simple, short and neat question of law" comes from R v. Tottenham and District Rent
Tribunal, exparte Northfield (Highgate) Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 103 at 108, Lord Goddard C.J., which was
quoted approvingly in Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 756 at 772 [Bell]. Bell's
case and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796,[1970]
S.C.R. 425 were the bete noire of the commentators, especially those associated with Osgoode Hall Law
School.
In this sketch I am following others in depicting this era based on a misleadingly small number of
high profile cases. Both Peter Hogg and David Mullan have shown that this fails to recognize the many
instances in which the Supreme Court of Canada showed considerable respect and deference to the
administrative process in this period. See Hogg, "The Supreme Court," supra note 207 at 221; D.J.
Mullan, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Tribunals-Deference to the Administrative Process: A
Recent Phenomenon or a Return to Basics?" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 399 at 422-25 [Mullan, "Supreme
Court of Canada and Tribunals"].
2281 rely here primarily on J. Evans, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1984-85 Term"
(1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1 at 26-29 [Evans, "The 1984-85 Term"], which was quoted from extensively
and approvingly by Wilson J. in her concurring judgment in National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada
(Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1337-38 [National Corn Growers].
229 Mullan, "Judicial Restraints," supra note 202 at 924.
2 3 0 Janisch, "Bora Laskin," supra note 202 at 578. Clearly a process of (sub)disciplinary boundary
maintenance is at work here. The processes of defining the groups, and the intellectual and personal
inclusion in and exclusion from groups, are matters that Schlegel's work suggests should be explored
in developing a fully socialized intellectual history. See Schlegel, "Ten Thousand Dollar Question,"
supra note 56 at 438, 466.
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It comes as no surprise then, that when the (re)turn to deference
came-the start of that positive dialogue or partnership 3t -it was in a
labour relations case.
Academic reaction to the Supreme Court's pre-CUPE stance was
part of a wholesale challenge to the Court's formalism and barren
conceptualism.232 As noted earlier, there had been relentless pressure on
the Supreme Court to rethink the relationship between the judiciary and
administrative agencies, and to accept that those agencies had been given
"the primary statutory responsibility for implementing and elaborating the
legislative mandate within their area of regulation."233 This rethinking had
implications for statutory interpretation and cast doubt upon the positivist
premises of the Supreme Court's previously interventionist approach,
namely, that there was one uniquely correct meaning of an agency's
constitutive legislation and that it must be provided by the judges. The
Court accepted that there was no bright line to be drawn between law and
policy, and so the knowledge, expertise, and insights of the front-line
agency should be respected and deferred to whenever possible.234 This
Canadian effort to reconcile the rule of law with the modern state-and to
leave Dicey behind-has aroused much interest elsewhere in the
Commonwealth.235
The adoption in CUPE of a policy of judicial restraint towards the
review of administrative agencies' determinations was seen by many as
bringing "Canadian administrative law out from under the long shadow cast
by Dicey. 2 36 CUPE has been followed nominally by the Supreme Court
231 This notion of partnership between courts and administrative agencies can be seen in A.S.
Abel, "Courts and Tribunals: Partners in Justice" in G.M. Wilner, ed., Jus et Societas: Essays in Tribute
to Wolfgang Friedmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) 1. Allan Hutchinson describes a similar
notion as "a pious self-delusion." See A.C. Hutchinson, "Mice Under A Chair: Democracy, Courts, and
the Administrative State" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 374 at 403.
232 See generally Weiler, Last Resort, supra note 204.
233 Evans, "The 1984-85 Term," supra note 228 at 27.
234 See e.g. National Corn Growers, supra note 228, quoting from J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch, R.C.B.
Risk & D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 3d ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1989) at 414.
235 See e.g. P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) c. 10; P.
Bayne, "The Court, the Parliament and the Government-Reflections on the Scope of Judicial Review"
(1992) 20 Fed. L. Rev. 1; Contra M. Aronson, B. Dyer & M. Groves, Judicial Review ofAdministrative
Action, 2d ed. (Sydney, LBC Information Services, 2000) at 182-83.
236 J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch, R.C.B. Risk & D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and
Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1995) at 820. See also National Corn Growers, supra
note 228 at 1332-25, per Wilson J.; Mullan, "Supreme Court of Canada and Tribunals," supra note 227
at 425-49. See also D. Dyzenhaus, "Dicey's Shadow" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 127; D. Dyzenhaus, "The
Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy," in Taggart, Province of Administrative Law,
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ever since, but the path of the Court's jurisprudence has been anything but
straight and smooth. The one thing that has not resulted is certainty; the
avalanche of Supreme Court cases continues, to the chagrin of casebook
compilers, teachers, students, and practitioners. Regular lapses back into
a more aggressive jurisdictional approach have provoked allegations of
departure from CUPE's spirit.
237
In much of this one can see Willis's hand. He favoured restricting
the courts' role to the area of ultra vires (that is, jurisdiction).238 He did not
want judges to be able to use doctrines like reasonableness to stray into
policy, and hence to interfere in politics. He would have applauded the
adoption of deference, for he argued all his professional life for judges to
learn their rather minor place in government and to keep within it. The
"pragmatic and functional" test would have won his approval also, insofar
as it focused on the particular tribunal. This is his principle of "uniqueness"
in operation. Willis championed functionalism as far back as 1935.239 That
the judges' monopoly on statutory interpretation should be broken was a
foundational belief of Willis. 240 He would have joined the academic tub-
thumping that accompanied CUPE.
Nevertheless, Willis would have been troubled, just as numerous
contemporary commentators are, 241 by the failure of the CUPE schema to
prevent lapses back into Diceyanism. Moreover, he would be aghast at the
development of reasonableness simpliciter-the recently-developed via
media between the "patently unreasonableness" and "correctness"
supra note 227, c. 13.
For a critical view of the CUPE project, see I. Holloway, "'A Sacred Right': Judicial Review of
Administrative Action as a Cultural Phenomenon" (1993-94) 22 Man. L.J. 28 at 69-71.
237 See generally J.M. Evans, "Jurisdictional Review in the Supreme Court: Realism, Romance
and Recidivism" (1991) 48 Admin. L. Rev. 255; B. Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of
Labour Laws Under the Charter. Of Realists, Romantics and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev.
685; B. Etherington, "Arbitration, Labour Boards and the Courts in the 1980: Romance Meets Realism"
(1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 405.
238 See e.g. Willis, "Nolan Case," supra note 144.
239 Willis, "Three Approaches," supra note 135.
240 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, supra note 104 at 171-72.
241 Compare Arthurs, WithouttheLaw, supra note 211 and D.J. Mullan, Book Review of"Without
the Law": Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England by W.H. Arthurs
(1987) 12 Queen's L.J. 106 at 110-16.
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standards of review-that arguably splits asunder the CUPE methodology
and rationale,242 potentially allowing Diceyan tendencies to creep back in.243
John Willis wanted to keep judicial review in its place, and it was a
rather small place. He accepted, after a shaky start, that in that space
judges were needed. It was the definition of that space, the settling of who
would decide its dimensions, and how, that bedeviled administrative law for
much of the twentieth century. To the generation of scholars after Willis at
Osgoode Hall Law School, who saw that space occupied by the judicial
protection of fundamental values, I think he would have said "phooey."244
He was, after all, a "government man," not a "civil liberties man.
''1
41
And that brings me finally to the "C" word, which I have so far
avoided. Willis never had to grapple with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,2 46 for he had retired by the time the Constitution was patriated.
It would not have been a welcome development in his eyes.247 Undoubtedly,
he would have seen it as the ultimate triumph of "lawyers' values," legalism,
and the juridification of politics. His critique of the judicial role in
administrative law applies with bells on to the judicial review of
legislation. 248 And many teacher-scholars at Osgoode Hall Law School have
carried the critique forward into what Willis would surely have called the
"Never-never Land" of the Charter.249 And once again, labour lawyers are
242 See generally M-H. Blais et al., Standards of Review of Federal Administrative Tribunals
(Markham: Butterworths, 2003); Donald J. M. Brown, J.M. Evans & Christine E. Deacon, Judicial
Review ofAdministrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998).
243 J. Sprague, "Another View of Baker" (1999) 7 Reid's Administrative Law 163.
244 He did call it "theological": Willis, "Retrospect," supra note 134 at 228.
245 In his teaching materials, Willis included a paragraph from an unpublished section of a talk
(entitled "Why are the Cases on 'Natural Justice' Confused and Uncertain") he gave to the 1962 annual
meeting of the Administrative Law section of the Canadian Bar Association. I have applied to him what
he said there of judges: "we are in the field of public law where the unspoken assumptions of the
individual judge-is he, for instance, a 'government man' or a 'civil liberties' man-is likely to make all
the difference in a close case." See Willis, Public Authorities, supra note 134 at 2-106.
246 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11.
247 See J. Willis, "Foreign Borrowings" (1970) 20 U.T.L.J. 274 at 279-81.
248 See Ison, "Sovereignty," supra note 205 at 17: "Almost all of the objections to judicial review
... apply to the Charter, but their significance is greater in this context, and more objections must be
added."
249 Seee.g. H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Stud. 84; A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter,
"Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278; J. Fudge & H.
Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics with a Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. and Legal Stud. 45;
Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Thompson Educational Press, 1994); A.C. Hutchinson, WaitingforCORAF:A Critique ofLaw and Rights
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among the leaders of the charge. And so the proud (and once again
dissenting) tradition of public law scholarship continues to this day in
Canada at Osgoode Hall Law School.
III. CONCLUSION
Much of what one learns today in administrative law classes in
Canada has its roots back in the "far-off Thirties, 25' and in the writings of
John Willis, among others. 1 In these days of globalization and at a time of
considerable theoretical imperialism from the United States, it is important
to recall and remember the influences that have shaped Canadian law and
society. Intellectual history allows us to see those influences, and to
celebrate those "titans" who wrote and taught in inhospitable conditions,
and whose voices echo down to us today.252 Like all teachers they created
frameworks of reference and understanding, and influenced thousands of
students and lawyers. Inevitably of course, the most able prisoners of those
frameworks break out and create new ones for themselves and future
generations of students and lawyers. As that intellectual cycle continues, it
is fitting to pause and celebrate our intellectual sometime-gaolers 3.2 1 If
intellectual legal history does nothing else, this may be reason enough to
undertake it.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); J. Fudge, "The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition,
Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the Courts" in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing & A. Tomkins, eds.,
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 335 at 337.
250 Willis, "Book Review of Fair Fights," supra note 164 at 232.
251 The focus on Willis should not overshadow other important thinkers from this period. See
more generally Risk, "Cold and Tygers," supra note 139; Brown, "Canadian Legal Realists," supra note
60.
252The histories of Dalhousie Law School and the pre-1957 period at Osgoode Hall depict
atrocious working conditions. See Willis, History, supra note 55; Bucknall, Baldwin & Lakin, supra note
83.
253 On the theme of law schools as intellectual prisons, see W. Twining, Blackstone's Tower: The
English Law School (London: Stevens & Sons, 1994) and the review by P. Goodrich, "Metaphors of
Distance and Histories of the English Law School" (1995) 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 901.
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